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Previous research has shown a strong relationship between party identification and participation in conventional political activities such as voting and campaign behavior. We extend these analyses by examining the effects of party identification and strength of identification on participation in both campaign activities and political protest. We hypothesize that party differences in these behaviors can be explained by the different levels of participatory incentives perceived by party identifiers and nonidentifiers. We specify a series of incentives derived from theories of collective action and measure them in a national and a community probability sample in the Federal Republic of Germany. The results show that the bivariate relationships between party identification and political participation can be explained largely through their mutual relationship with participatory incentives such as policy dissatisfaction, belief in the moral justifiability of various forms of behavior, and willingness to conform to the behavioral expectations of important others. The effects of identification with all parties on participation are substantially reduced once the effects of the incentives are taken into account, and for protest participation, only identification with the Greens shows a nonnegligible net impact.

Introduction

Party support long has been viewed as an important motivation for individual political participation. In virtually every study conducted with opinion surveys in the United States, West Germany, and other democracies, individuals who report strong identification with a political party are more likely to vote, attend campaign meetings and rallies, and work for the party's electoral success than individuals with weak or nonexistent party attachments (Budge, Crewe, and Fairlie 1976; Campbell et al. 1960; Dalton 1988; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). Political participation, however, encompasses much more than voting and campaign activity. In particular, western democracies

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have experienced a sharp rise in protest since the 1960s, yet very little is known about the role of party support in motivating these forms of behavior. Although national and cross-national surveys have increasingly focused on measuring and accounting for individual participation in demonstrations and other protest activities, no study has yet included attitudes toward parties or party support in its empirical models (Barnes et al. 1979; Marsh 1977; Muller 1979).

In this paper we integrate several hypotheses regarding the effects of party support on political participation into a general incentives model that includes a broad range of perceived costs and benefits as predictors of individual behavior. We then test this model with recent survey data from a national and a community sample in the Federal Republic of Germany. The results show that significant differences exist in the rates of campaign and protest behavior between party groups, and between strong and weak party identifiers. Further, the differences can be explained to a large extent by the benefits and costs included in the incentives model.

Party Identification and Political Action: Alternative Hypotheses

Empirical studies of voting behavior from the 1950s until the present establish a clear relationship between attachment to political parties and electoral participation: individuals with a strong sense of identification with a party are more likely to vote than independents or those with weak party attachments (Abramson 1982; Campbell et al. 1960; Conway 1985). Party identification both reflects and reinforces an individual's psychological involvement in politics and concern over election outcomes, thus encouraging electoral participation. This finding has been replicated cross-nationally (Dalton 1988; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978), and has also been extended to offer forms of conventional political behavior such as campaign participation and communal activity (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978).

While the effect of party identification on conventional political participation is clear and consistent, its impact on other forms of behavior is largely unknown. The major national and cross-national investigations into the causes of unconventional or protest behavior have not included partisan loyalties in their empirical models (Barnes et al. 1979; Muller 1979).[1] Moreover, there is much theoretical disagreement regarding the expected role of party identification in motivating or inhibiting these forms of political action. Two main alternative hypotheses may be distinguished.

[1] Barnes et al. (1979) included a measure of vote choice for parties of the left, center, and right, but did not analyze the impact of party identifcation in their general model of political participation.

The Party Integration Hypothesis

Early party identification studies hypothesized that strong party attachments among individuals would contribute to political stability by inhibiting the rise of minor parties and possibly antidemocratic mass movements (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse and Dupeux 1962). Strong support for existing parties would reflect an individual's general integration into the established electoral and political system, promoting conventional forms of participation and making elite or system-challenging behavior less likely to occur. This claim is also consistent with the "mass society" theories of the 1950s (Kornhauser 1959), which argue that party and other secondary group attachments among individuals provide a basis for the stability of democratic regimes.

Individual integration into the party system also plays a role in more recent accounts of the rise of protest in the United States and Western Europe in the late 1960s and 1970s. Inglehart (1977) and Barnes et al. (1979) argue that protest increased in part as many individuals became detached from the policies and values expressed by the existing parties. As Western societies became more educated and affluent in the postwar period, a significant segment of the population adopted new "post-materialist" values which led to increased concern for issues such as environmental protection and nuclear energy. As these concerns were not reflected in the established institutions, individuals became detached from the existing party system and more willing to express their dissatisfaction and grievances through nonelectoral, elite-challenging forms of collective action such as protest. Thus, both sets of theories lead to a "party integration" hypothesis, where strong identification with parties is linked to relatively *low* levels of unconventional political participation, e.g., political protest.

The Party Mobilization Hypothesis

Recent developments in contemporary West European politics, however, point to an alternative hypothesis regarding the relationship of party identification and political behavior. So-called "New Politics" parties such as the Greens in West Germany have engaged not only in electoral-related activity; they also have aligned themselves with unconventional social protest movements regarding nuclear energy, the deployment of nuclear missiles, and environmental protection (Bürklin 1985; Müller-Rommel 1985, 1990). Far from integrating their followers solely into institutionalized electoral patterns of political participation, the Greens appear to encourage protest in order to achieve certain policy goals. Further, as a response to the electoral challenge posed by the Greens, the Social Democratic party (SPD) has begun to move closer to the Greens on some policy issues, and by the mid-1980s had begun to endorse some nonviolent, antinuclear, and environmental protest actions

in an effort to win back some of their former supporters (Dalton 1988, 138; Rochon 1988, 160–62). These developments suggest a "party mobilization" hypothesis of political protest, where individuals who are stongly attached to particular parties are *more* likely to protest than nonidentifiers. This model is compatible as well with "resource mobilization" theories of political protest (Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973), which posit that integration into particular groups is necessary to enhance the individual's opportunities and resources for engaging in protest behavior.

The Party Incentives Model

These conflicting hypotheses, we argue, can be reconciled through application of a more general motivational model of participation in collective political action based on rational action, or expectancy-value, theories of behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Feather 1982; Klandermans 1984). According to expectancy-value theory, individuals act on the basis of the "perceived attractiveness or aversiveness of expected consequences" (Feather 1982, 1); that is, individuals will participate in collective political action if the expected outcomes of their behavior have a net positive value. From prior theoretical and empirical work within these traditions, we specify what we call the *party incentives model*, which includes a broad range of behavioral incentives that motivate individual political participation.[2] The incentives approach suggests that party identification may be related either positively or negatively to participation, depending on the value of a series of expected behavioral consequences perceived by individuals who identify with various party groups. We show this model in diagram form as figure 1.

We hypothesize that the relationship between party support and political action can be explained in three ways. First, parties differ in the extent to which they encourage certain forms of behavior from their followers, and the extent to which their leaders engage in various kinds of political activity. Identification with parties may then represent a direct incentive for participation, as individuals will attempt to conform with the behavioral cues and expectations of the party leadership and party organization. This direct effect

[2]The model includes a wide range of material and nonmaterial behavioral incentives derived from prior research. For example, Ajzen and Fishbein's expectancy-value model of behavior (1980) includes incentives such as "personal normative beliefs" about the action, as well as adhering to social norms promoting or proscribing behavior. Klandermans' model of participation (1984) in collective union activities includes what he calls the "social motive," or adhering to the behavioral expectations of others, as well as a "reward" motive based on monetary and other material costs and benefits. Our own prior research has also included these kinds of nonmaterial incentives, recognizing their importance in accounting for protest participation as well (Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989; Muller and Opp 1986; Opp 1986, 1989). The resultant model is consistent with the expectancy-value approach, but is of course quite different from the more narrow, materially-oriented models commonly associated with "rational choice."

FIGURE 1

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND POLITICAL ACTION



Note: Arrows denote causal effects, double arrows denote correlations.

of party identification on political action is represented by path "a" in figure 1. Second, individuals in different party groups likely will differ in their preferences for certain "public goods" or policy goals, as well as in their perceptions of the potential effectiveness and moral propriety of attempting to achieve those goals through conventional and unconventional political action. Thus, behavioral differences between adherents of party groups may be explained through these public goods-related incentives that motivate individual participation. This process is shown in path "b" of the figure, and represents a correlated effect between party identification and political participation. Third, other material, social and psychological incentives may also relate to both party identification and participation. For example, individuals in different party groups may perceive a higher or lower likelihood of physical injury from participation in protest activities, or a higher or lower level of approval from family, friends, or others in their social networks, which may in turn motivate or inhibit political participation. Behavioral differences between individuals in various party groups may then result from their differences on these relevant incentives, and this type of spurious association between identification and participation is represented by path "c" in figure 1.

The incentives model is able to explain the apparently contradictory "party integration" and "party mobilization" hypotheses discussed above regarding protest behavior. Underlying each of the hypotheses are a series of assumptions about the likely incentives perceived by individuals who more or less identify with particular parties. For example, the "integration" hypothesis assumes that established parties discourage unconventional behavior, while the "mobilization" hypothesis predicts that at least some parties will encourage protest on the part of their supporters. Differences also exist in the assumptions of the two hypotheses regarding the public goods-related incentives for protest: the integration hypothesis suggests that individuals will believe that protest is inefficacious and possibly morally unacceptable, while the mobilization hypothesis assumes the opposite for individuals in certain party groups. The incentives model, then, specifies explicitly the relevant factors that may lead to higher or lower levels of different forms of participation for different party groups, and thus it subsumes prior hypotheses into a more general model of political action. We outline each component of the party incentives model in more detail below.

A. *Party Behavioral Expectations.* One basic prediction from party identification and related social-psychological theories is that individuals who identify with particular parties will attempt to adhere to the behavioral cues and expectations of the party leadership or party organization. Thus, identification represents a direct positive or negative incentive to engage in a given form of political action, depending on the party's expectations. This reasoning holds if we adopt the standard definition of party identification found in *The American Voter* (1960, 121): "We use the concept here to characterize the individual's affective orientation to an important group-object in his environment . . . The political party serves as the group toward which the individual may develop an identification, positive or negative, of some degree of intensity." A wide range of theories support the contention that individuals, given strong affective attachment to particular groups, should be motivated to conform to the groups' behavioral expectations. Both Ajzen and Fishbein's expectancy-value theory (1980) and Bandura's social learning theory (1977, 1986), specify the expectations of important others as an important motivating factor for individual behavior. Reference group theory also suggests that group leaders may represent models on which individuals base their own attitudes and behavior, since individuals will tend "to assimilate the sentiments and conform with the values of the authoritative and prestigeful stratum in th[e] group" (Merton 1957, 254; cf. also Hyman and Singer 1968). Finally, a high extent of identification, or a strong attachment to an organization, is called "loyalty" by the economist Albert Hirschman (1970, 81). Hirschman integrates this concept into rational choice theory, and suggests that acting against the expectations of the organization results in penalties or costs to the individual, most of which are internalized (1970, 98).

This reasoning suggests that if a party encourages certain types of political action, those strongly identifying with the party will be more likely to comply with the party's behavioral expectations and cues emanating from the party leadership, than those who weakly identify or who do not identify with the respective party. Since we may assume that every party encourages its adherents to vote and campaign for it, we expect that party identifiers will be more likely to engage in campaign behavior than nonidentifiers—the more so, the stronger the individual's sense of identification. However, levels of unconventional participation should differ widely among party groups, stemming from the parties' varying expectations for these types of actions.

B. Public Goods-Related Incentives. In addition to conforming to the behavioral expectations of a party, individuals may also perceive incentives for participation relating to their preferences for "public goods," and their perceptions of the strategically and morally appropriate ways of achieving them. These variables should in turn strongly relate to party identification, and hence render at least part of the overall observed correlation between identification and behavior spurious.

Many collective policy goals or political grievances can be viewed as preferences for public goods, i.e., goods that would affect or benefit all members of a collectivity, regardless of whether the individual contributes toward its provision. Primary public goods preferences that may motivate participation include dissatisfaction with specific government policies or values (Barnes et al. 1979; Inglehart 1977), or more general alienation from the political system (Muller 1979); here we focus on policy dissatisfaction.[3] Party identification should clearly correlate strongly with an individual's preferences for public goods, since parties typically serve to aggregate interests and articulate the policy preferences of particular segments of the population (Eldersfeld 1982).

In Germany, for example, identification with the Christian Democratic Party, which heads the governing coalition, likely will be associated with different policy concerns, and also lower levels of policy dissatisfaction than identification with the Social Democrats or the Greens. In addition, Green party adherents likely will have the highest levels of grievances based on the intensity of their opposition to nuclear, defense, and environmental policies. Party identification may therefore reflect these individual differences in policy preferences and satisfaction with government policy performance, both

[3]The dissatisfaction scale includes some items that can be viewed as "postmaterialist" policy preferences, including questions relating to environmental pollution, nuclear power, and the deployment of nuclear missiles in West Germany. Factor analyses (described in more detail in the appendix) showed that these items, as well as one "materialist" item concerning unemployment, and one "mixed" item concerning the differences between rich and poor, all loaded on the same factor. We therefore did not include specific measures of postmaterialist value preferences in the subsequent analyses. For more on the relationship between postmaterialism and political protest, see Opp (1990).

of which have been shown to correlate with differential rates of campaign as well as unconventional participation (Verba and Nie 1972, 224–28; Muller and Jukam 1983).

According to rational action theory, however, simple demands for public goods are not *incentives* for political participation unless they are also accompanied by perceptions that collective action will be efficacious in achieving policy or systemic change, and that individual contributions to the collective movement are required. Individuals must believe first that collective action can be successful, since otherwise the cause would be hopeless and no individual has incentive to join. However, a strong likelihood of the overall success of collective action is also not an incentive for individual participation when considered alone. If a group as a whole is thought likely to succeed, the well-known "free-rider" problem results, and individuals should be likely to abstain and allow others to bear the costs of action to provide the given public good (Olson 1965; Tullock 1971). We show elsewhere (Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989) that public goods preferences interact with three variables to overcome the pressure to free-ride: perceptions of the likelihood of overall group success in providing the public good; perceptions of personal influence on the provision of the public good; and belief in principles that promote the participation of *all* group members, or what can be called "collective rationality." One such principle is the strategic belief that unity is necessary for group success, i.e., that public goods can be provided only through contributions from all group members. Another principle is a belief in an ethical duty to help contribute to provide a strongly desired public good if others are doing the same and the group is likely to succeed. These variables interact multiplicatively with preferences for public goods to provide an "instrumental public goods motivation" for individual participation in collective political action.

Moral justifications that prescribe participation, however, may have an additional effect on behavior, independent of the perceived likelihood of group success or of the individual's perceived personal influence. Individuals may differ greatly in the extent to which they believe that participation in certain forms of behavior is morally justifiable in the pursuit of political goals, and this belief may strongly influence individual participation in both legal and illegal political behavior (Muller 1979; Opp 1986, 1989). Personal normative beliefs about the appropriateness of engaging in political participation outside the traditional electoral process should have an important influence on individual behavior, as should more specific norms about breaking the law or using violence in the pursuit of political goals. Thus we specify an additional "normative public goods motivation" for participation as an interaction between preferences for public goods and beliefs in the moral justifiability of taking part in a given form of action in order to achieve the public good in question.

It is likely that large differences between party groups will exist on these variables, and will go far in explaining observed differences in their participation in conventional and unconventional collective action. To identify with a party means to be more likely to possess preferences for particular public goods or policy goals, and to endorse particular means to achieve them as efficacious and morally acceptable. To the extent that these variables motivate political participation, they will then account for the simple relationship between party support and collective political action.

C. Material, Social Network, and Psychological Incentives. Political action, however, cannot be explained by incentives related to public goods alone, and a variety of empirical and theoretical studies suggest that other private material, social, and psychological incentives may also be relevant for explaining individual participation (Klandermans 1984; Muller and Opp 1986; Opp, 1986, 1989; Tullock 1971; Uhlaner 1989). To the extent that these incentives are also related to party identification, they would also help explain the observed differences between party groups for particular forms of political action.

Specifically, *material* incentives include expected negative sanctions such as injury or arrest which may deter protest, and expected financial and occupational gains associated with participating in collective political action. Other private incentives stem from significant other persons and groups in the individual's *social network.* These include conforming to the behavioral expectations of others such as family, friends or colleagues, confroming to the expectations of groups to which the individual belongs, and the desire to meet and get to know other people who share one's political views. These types of social incentives long have been identified as relevant for participation within interest groups and other organizations (cf. Clark and Wilson 1961; Knoke 1988), and recent empirical research has confirmed their importance more generally for participation in protest and unconventional activities as well (Klandermans 1984; Muller and Opp 1986; Opp 1989). Finally, individuals may participate in order to obtain new knowledge about politics, or simply for the "entertainment value" of participation, especially when the costs are low (Tullock 1971). We call these types of incentives *psychological,* because the "rewards" received from participation are purely internally-provided.

Although these material, social network, and psychological incentives are not necessarily conceptually related to party support, they may be related empirically. For example, Christian Democratic party identifiers may belong to fewer groups that encourage protest, and Social Democratic and Green identifiers may perceive more occupational and financial risk in protesting, because they would be protesting against the policies of the governing Christian Democrats. If any of these relationships hold, and if the incentives

themselves are related to a particular type of political action, then this would also help explain observed party differences in participation rates.

The party incentives model thus allows an integration of party identification into a general motivational model of political action. We expect that, to the extent that differences exist between party groups for conventional and unconventional participation, they can be explained through three processes: the direct impact of party support, indicating individual conformity with behavioral cues and expectations of the party; the impact of public goods-related incentives such as policy dissatisfaction and moral norms justifying particular forms of political action; and the impact of other incentives representing material, social network, and psychological rewards from behavior. Further, to the extent that the incentives model does explain the party-participation relationship, its findings should remain stable after taking into account the impact of potentially relevant demographic factors such as age, education, and social class (Barnes et al. 1979; Verba and Nie 1972).

Research Design and Measurement

We test our hypotheses with data from West Germany where, in 1987–1988 four parties held seats in the national parliament (Bundestag): the Christian Democratic Party/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU),[4] the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the Green Party (Die Grünen). Germany is a particularly well-suited country in which to test the relationship between party identification and all forms of political participation, because of the presence there of many different types of political parties, including the Greens, who have supported both electoral and more unconventional forms of participation in order to achieve certain policy goals. At the time of our survey, moreover, the West German Greens had attained the highest national electoral success of any single Green party in Europe, thus representing a sizeable constituency within the country.[5] In the 1987 national election, the percentage of votes for the four parties were: CDU 44.3%, SPD 37.0%, FDP 9.1%, Greens 8.3%, with other parties together totalling 1.4%. Our data did not include a sufficient number of respondents identifying with the FDP or other parties, and so we exclude these individuals from the subsequent analyses.[6]

[4]To be more precise, the CDU forms a coalition with the CSU (Christian Social Union-Christlich Soziale Union) that runs for election only in Bavaria. For the sake of simplicity henceforth we only refer to the CDU.

[5]Other cross-national surveys, of course, have been conducted that also contain measures of party identification and participation. None, however, include measures of identification with such varied types of political parties, measures of electoral and protest participation, and measures of the relevant behavioral incentives in our theoretical model. Thus we rely on original data rather than on secondary sources for the subsequent testing of our hypotheses.

[6]Of the 1,208 respondents in the two samples to be used, only 41 describe themselves as FDP identifers. By contrast, there are 175 CDU, 230 SPD, and 111 GREEN identifers. The

We use data pooled from two surveys that were conducted in the Federal Republic of Germany during November 1987 to January 1988, where respondents of age 18 and older were interviewed. One of the surveys is a representative sample of the national population of West Germany ($N = 714$). However, few respondents from a typical national sample have engaged in unconventional, and especially illegal political behavior. To increase variation on the dependent variables, we also conducted interviews with a random sample of 494 respondents in a so-called "counter-culture" area, the Bockenheim district of Frankfurt, where many young people, students, Green identifiers, and social movement participants reside. Combining the two samples yields a total of N of 1,208, of which 1,122 respondents identified with the CDU/CSU, the SPD, the Greens, or who reported no party identification.[7]

The data were collected by the GFM-GETAS survey research institute in Hamburg, a firm with expertise in designing and implementing surveys on protest and political participation. Each survey was a probability sample drawn according to the design of the Working Group of German Market Research Institutes (ADM-Master-Sample). In this procedure the first step is to select sample points (voting districts), e.g., 210 in the representative national sample. Then the interviewer looks for households according to a random route procedure. Finally, a member of the household is randomly selected to be interviewed.

We measured participation in campaign participation and in legal and illegal protest according to the procedures outlined in Finkel, Muller, and Opp (1989). The scales represent a multiplicative interaction between past participation and future behavioral intention regarding each activity, and are all logged to the base 10, with minimum values of 0 and maximum values of 1.18 in our samples. The measurement procedure for the behavior scales is described in further detail in the appendix, and the measurement of the other independent variables included in the analysis proceeded as follows.

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number of individuals in each sample that identify with all the party groups is as follows. Strong CDU identifiers: National sample, 60, Frankfurt, 47. Weak CDU identifiers: National sample, 46, Frankfurt, 22. Strong SPD identifiers: National sample, 101, Frankfurt, 56. Weak SPD identifiers: National sample, 51, Frankfurt, 22. Strong Green identifiers: National sample, 22, Frankfurt, 50. Weak Green identifiers: National sample 13, Frankfurt, 26.

[7]The pooling strategy was used also to ensure enough respondents in certain party categories in the subsequent empirical analyses. For example, in the national sample there were only 13 individuals who "weakly" identified with the Greens, and only 26 "weak" CDU/CSU adherents in the Frankfurt subsample (see footnote 6). Analyzing the two samples separately, however, yields very similar results, and including dummy variables to signify sample membership in the regression models of table 3 shows an insignificant effect in the models. Thus the pooling strategy increases the reliability of our findings without obscuring important differences in the behavioral tendencies of individuals in the two samples.

Measurement of Party Identification. Respondents were asked whether there is a party in the FRG they "feel close to." If the respondent answered "no," she or he was classified as a nonidentifier. If the respondent answered "yes," she or he was asked to indicate that party, and then to indicate whether she or he felt "very close," "fairly close," or "not very close" to the party. This measurement scheme departs from the traditional questions used in the United States but follows previous studies in measuring party identification in other democracies (e.g., Barnes et al. 1979).[8] Because most respondents claimed to be either "fairly" or "not very" close to their party, we combined the "very close" and "fairly close" categories into "Strong Identification" and the "not very close" category into "Weak Identification." We thus arrived at a nominal variable with the following categories: no identification, weak identification with the CDU, strong identification with the CDU, weak identification with the SPD, strong identification with the SPD, weak identification with the Greens, and strong identification with the Greens.

Measurement of the Instrumental Public Goods Motivation. We measured an individual's preferences for public goods in the form of policy dissatisfaction, again following the procedures of previous research (Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989). The scale is an average of a respondent's concern over a set of policies multiplied by perceptions of satisfaction with government performance in that area. The exact questions and scaling procedures can be found in the prior article, and are reprinted in the appendix.

As discussed above, however, public goods incentives become a relevant incentive for *individual* participation (i.e., outweigh the pressure to free-ride) when they are weighted by perceptions of personal influence on the provision of the goods, the likelihood of overall group success, and belief in principles of "collective rationality" that link the individual to the group. We measured each of these variables as in prior research, and again the procedures are described in the appendix. The instrumental public goods variable that we use in further analyses here is a simple multiplicative combination of all the terms measured in this section.

Measurement of Normative Public Goods Motivation. For legal behaviors, we asked individuals one item to measure whether respondents feel that taking part in nonelectoral actions was morally justifiable: the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that "Politics should be left to our elected

[8]The Barnes et al. question was: "Many people in Germany lean towards a particular party for a long time, although they may occasionally vote for a different party. How about you: Do you in general lean towards a particular party? If so, which one?" We suspect that the initial suggestion that "many people" lean toward a party produced fewer "nonidentifiers" than was found in our study. In the other countries besides Germany and Austria in the Barnes-Kaase study, the party identifcation question was "which political party do you usually feel closest to?"

representatives." To measure respondents' beliefs in the moral justifiability of violence, we asked three questions: "If citizens struggle for important political causes, violating the law may be necessary"; "Violence against property in order to achieve certain political goals is morally justifiable"; and "Violence against persons in order to achieve certain political goals is morally justifiable." Each item was transformed to a scale of 0 to 1 (from 5 response categories) and then two normative public goods motivation variables were constructed: one for legal behaviors by multiplying the "elected representatives" item by the individual's extent of policy dissatisfaction; and one for illegal protest by multiplying the average of the three moral justifiability of violence items by the individual's policy dissatisfaction. High scores on these variables indicate that the respondent has a strong preference for changing government policies and believes that engaging in the particular form of behavior to pursue those goals is morally appropriate.

Measurement of Material Incentives. Respondents were presented sets of items referring to events that could happen if they took part in specifically legal actions, such as campaign activities or participation in permitted demonstrations, or if they took part in illegal actions, such as blocking streets or damaging property. We measured perceptions of **legal, and illegal, negative sanctions** from estimates of the probability (with "0" being very unlikely to "3" being very likely) that they would "get into trouble with the police or the courts," and the chances "that they could get hurt." The two items were added and divided by two, resulting in two scales (for legal and illegal actions) with a value range of 0 to 3. High values refer to the perception that official sanctions are relatively likely.

We measured the individual's expectation of **financial or occupational gains** for legal behavior from two probability estimates of the following consequences from participation: "It would help me at work"; and "I would gain financially," each measured with four categories from 0 (very unlikely) to 3 (very likely). The items were averaged. For illegal protest, we presented respondents only with the "gain financially item," because it was implausible to expect individuals to be helped at work through engaging in unlawful action.

Measurement of Social Network Incentives. We measured the **expectations of others** regarding legal and illegal behavior by requesting respondents to think of those people whose opinion is important to them, such as their spouse, friends and colleagues, and then asked them how those people would react to them if they were to participate in each type of political action. Respondents could choose between five codes, "1" indicating a very negative, and "5" indicating a very positive judgment.

We also measured the extent to which respondents were **members in**

groups encouraging legal and illegal behavior. Respondents went through a list of types of groups and told the interviewer of which they are a member. Respondents were then requested to report their perceptions of whether each membership group encourages or discourages protest, or whether it does not care either way. We then counted separately the number of groups to which the respondent belonged that encouraged legal and illegal political action. Respondents who held no membership in any political action encouraging group were assigned the value 0, and the maximum scale value for both group encouragement scales was 12.

We measured the extent to which the individual expected to **meet people** through legal and illegal action by asking respondents the probability that, if they engaged in that form of action, "I could get to know people with similar interests and views." There were four answer categories, from "very unlikely," coded as zero, to "very likely," coded as three.

Measurement of Psychological Incentives. We measured the extent to which the individual expected to **gain knowledge** through participation by asking respondents the probability that, if they engaged in first legal, then illegal activities, "I would understand politics better." The item was coded from 0, indicating "very unlikely," to 3, indicating "very likely."

We measured the **entertainment** value of political participation with one general item: "Being involved in politics is a very enjoyable experience." The item ranges from 1–5, with high values connoting strong agreement. Because respondents typically answer this type of general question with only legal behaviors in mind, we use the entertainment variable only in the models predicting legal behaviors.

Measurement of Demographic Variables. We included three sociodemographic factors in the analyses as statistical controls: the respondent's **age,** measured in years; **education,** measured as the highest education diploma received by the individual and coded from one to six, with six being an *Abitur* or university-entry diploma;[9] and subjective **social class,** measured on a one to five point scale ranging from "lower social class" and "lower middle class" to "upper middle class" and "upper class."

For all quantitative variables, missing values were substituted by the arithmetic means of the variables. In general there were very few missing values. If more than 5% of the cases were missing (which occurred with only one item), bivariate correlations with the dependent variables were computed with and without replacement of missing values. Since the results were virtually identical, we decided in favor of replacement.

[9]The exact scale values were: 1, left school with no diploma; 2, 9-year elementary school diploma; 3, 10-year school diploma; 4, polytechnic entry diploma; 5, current student in general education or technical secondary school; and 6, *Abitur* or university entry diploma.

Results

Party Identification and Political Action

We present first the overall rates of participation for campaigning, legal, and illegal protest for all party groups in table 1.

The table shows that significant differences exist for all modes of behavior, indicating that certain groups of party identifiers are more likely to engage in particular activities than others. The most consistent finding is that both strong and weak Green party identifiers are much more active in all forms of behavior than the other groups. This pattern is perhaps not surprising for protest activities, but the fact that the Greens are more active in even conventional campaign behaviors is noteworthy. Beyond the general pattern of Green activism, the table contains several other interesting findings.

First, a comparison of nonidentifiers and identifiers shows that nonidentifiers are more active than most party groups in legal and illegal protest. They are more active than CDU identifiers and weak SPD identifiers for legal protest, and more active than all but the Greens in illegal protest activites. Only for campaigning does party identification *per se* appear to activate higher levels of participation, and even here nonidentifiers are equally active as weak identifiers with the Christian Democrats.

Second, among the party groups, strong identifiers typically participate more than do weak identifiers. To test the significance of these observed differences, we conducted an analysis of variance with party identification (with the SPD, CDU/CSU, and the Greens) and strength of identification as main effects. For campaign behavior and for legal protest, identification as well as strength of identification showed statistically significant effects; i.e., strong

Table 1

Mean Levels of Political Participation for all Party Groups

Party Identification	Campaign Action	Legal Protest	Illegal Protest	*N*
NO ID	.32	.36	.08	(606)
ID CDU				
Weak	.32	.29	.03	(68)
Strong	.39	.32	.02	(107)
ID SPD				
Weak	.35	.35	.06	(73)
Strong	.51	.46	.07	(157)
ID Greens				
Weak	.65	.76	.27	(39)
Strong	.77	.80	.33	(72)
Eta	.38**	.44**	.46**	(1,122)

Note: **significant at the .01 level.

identifiers were significantly more participatory in general than weak identifiers across all party groups. For illegal protest, however, only the effect of identification was significant, with both strong and weak Green identifiers being much more likely to engage in these forms of behavior than all other party groups. Interestingly, there were no significant interaction effects between identification and strength in any test, suggesting that the effect of strength of party identification on political action is constant for all three party groups.

Table 1 suggests that the relationship between party identification and political action is by no means a simple one. The generalization from previous research that party identifiers are more active, and that strong identifiers are the most active, is confirmed only for campaign behavior. The prediction from the "party integration" hypothesis that identification with established parties would lead to less unconventional behavior is not supported, as strong SPD identifiers are more likely to engage in legal protest and about as likely to engage in illegal protest as nonidentifiers. Finally, the prediction from the "party mobilization" hypothesis that identification with certain parties leads to unconventional behavior is only partially confirmed. Green party identifiers are certainly more active in legal and illegal protest, but nonidentification is also often associated with unconventional action, suggesting alternative paths to protest than those outlined in the mobilization model.

According to the party incentives model, these conflicting findings may be explained through differential perceptions of the costs and benefits associated with each form of behavior for each party group. Thus, we turn next to an examination of the groups of incentives discussed above: behavioral expectations of the parties, public goods-related incentives, and other material, social network, and psychological incentives relevant for political participation.

Behavioral Expectations

To even the casual observer of contemporary West German politics, it is clear that the political parties have vastly different expectations of their followers regarding various modes of political participation. While Green party leaders and members are often present at protest events, leaders and members of the SPD are less visible, and those of the CDU are almost never active (Hülsberg 1988; Papadakis 1984).[10] Thus Green identifiers and, to a lesser extent, SPD identifiers who model their behavior after the party leadership should be more disposed to engage in unconventional protest be-

[10] Hülsberg and Papadakis offer several examples of Green party organization and participation in protests, such as the October 10, 1985 action against the nuclear recycling plant under construction in Wackersdorf (Hülsberg 1988, 176–79), the 1982–1983 demonstrations against the expansion of runways at Frankfurt Airport (Papadakis 1984, 87), and the November 1981 protest in support of disarmament during the visit of then-Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev (Papadakis 1984, 181). Violence accompanied some of these demonstrations, and both Hülsberg

haviors, while CDU adherents should be least disposed to perform legal and illegal protest behavior.

Empirical evidence for differing behavioral norms of the party organization comes from the responses of the *members* of the various parties interviewed in our samples, and in an independent investigation by Greven (1987). As part of a series of group-related questions described earlier, we asked individuals if they were members of any political party, and if so, whether the party encouraged or discouraged "you to take part in activities like signing petitions or taking part in demonstrations," and if they encouraged or discouraged "you to take part in activities like sit-ins and blocking streets," or if they did not care one way or another. While the number of members of any party was quite small (less than 10% of the total sample), the pattern of responses to these questions strongly confirms this argument. For legal behavior, only 38% of the CDU members perceived encouragement from the party, while the corresponding figures for the SPD and Greens were 71 and 100, respectively. For illegal protest, only 3% of the CDU and 8% of the SPD members believed the party encouraged this form of behavior, while two-thirds of the Green members perceived party encouragement.

Greven's analysis (1987) also confirms these propositions. Greven presented in 1983–1984 a self-administered questionnaire to 1,034 members of the CDU, SPD, and Greens from several party chapters ("Ortsvereine" and "Kreisverbände," see chap. 2). This sample was in part random, in part a total survey of all chapter members. In general, members of the CDU were least likely to engage in legal and illegal political actions, whereas members of the Green party were most engaged. Thus, one explanation of the differential rates of behavior for the different party groups is that identifiers model their own behavior after the party leadership and membership, and attempt to conform to the behavioral norms of the organization.

Public Goods and Private Incentives

The relationship between party support and political action, however, may also be explained through their mutual relationship with other incentives relevant for political participation. We outlined two general classes of these incentives above: incentives related to the policy goals of the parties and the most effective and morally appropriate means of achieving those "public goods"; and the material, social network and psychological incentives that may motivate behavior independent of party support. We present the means of all these incentives, as well as the means for potentially relevant demographic variables, for all party groups and nonidentifiers in table 2.

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and Papadakis devote considerable attention to splits within the Green party organization over endorsement of these actions and more general disagreements concerning the efficacy and moral justifiability of political violence (see esp. Hülsberg 1988, chaps. 8–10; Papadakis 1984, chap. 8).

TABLE 2

MEAN VALUES OF INCENTIVES FOR POLITICAL ACTION AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES FOR ALL PARTY GROUPS

		ID CDU		ID SPD		ID Greens			
	No ID	weak	strong	weak	strong	weak	strong	ETA	Range
Public Goods Incentives									
Policy Dissatisfaction	10.93	7.08	7.68	11.50	11.73	14.67	16.35	.45**	0–20
Personal Influence									
Campaigning	.42	.44	.47	.41	.49	.56	.56	.19**	0–1
Legal Protest	.44	.46	.46	.44	.50	.57	.57	.16**	0–1
Illegal Protest	.17	.11	.07	.17	.15	.40	.37	.34**	0–1
Group Success									
Campaigning	.31	.30	.30	.32	.36	.40	.44	.22*	0–1
Legal Protest	.33	.32	.30	.34	.38	.40	.44	.20**	0–1
Illegal Protest	.08	.04	.04	.08	.08	.16	.20	.38**	0–1
Collective Rationality	.62	.56	.63	.63	.68	.72	.78	.22**	0–1
Moral Justification									
Legal Action	.55	.40	.43	.52	.57	.85	.91	.33**	0–1
Illegal Protest	.20	.10	.11	.20	.18	.38	.45	.36**	0–1
Instrumental Public Goods Motivation									
Campaigning	1.10	.55	.78	1.01	1.85	2.09	3.23	.37**	0–20
Legal Protest	1.35	.66	.79	1.34	1.80	2.63	3.35	.34**	0–20
Illegal Protest	.21	.03	.03	.29	.17	.80	1.21	.38**	0–20
Normative Public Goods Motivation									
Legal Action	6.58	2.83	3.18	6.44	7.12	12.69	15.02	.48**	0–20
Illegal Protest	2.36	.89	.93	2.35	2.13	5.44	7.43	.46**	0–20

Material Incentives									
Negative Sanctions									
Legal Action	.77	.62	.66	.66	.71	.84	.91	.10	0–3
Illegal Protest	1.95	2.08	1.81	1.91	1.98	1.85	1.94	.07	0–3
Financial/Occupational Gains									
Legal Action	.31	.19	.25	.21	.28	.26	.31	.08	0–3
Illegal Protest	.29	.21	.26	.28	.24	.21	.24	.05	0–3
Social Network Incentives									
Expectations of Others									
Legal Action	2.92	2.71	2.50	2.73	3.01	3.60	3.78	.26**	1–5
Illegal Protest	1.75	1.29	1.29	1.53	1.60	2.85	2.77	.38**	1–5
Group Encouragement									
Legal Action	.15	.03	.21	.15	.57	.46	.76	.30**	0–12
Illegal Protest	.03	.00	.02	.03	.11	.03	.38	.27**	0–12
Meeting People									
Legal Action	1.95	1.66	1.58	1.85	2.01	2.49	2.51	.24***	0–3
Illegal Protest	1.59	1.17	1.30	1.64	1.63	2.10	2.29	.23**	0–3
Psychological Incentives									
Gaining Knowledge									
Legal Action	1.20	1.19	1.02	1.37	1.32	1.28	1.47	.11*	0–3
Illegal Protest	.79	.78	.72	.89	.82	1.10	1.32	.16**	0–3
Entertainment	2.05	2.29	2.38	2.16	2.57	2.57	2.67	.21**	1–5
Demographic Variables									
Age	43.49	53.46	59.83	50.59	50.68	31.74	30.10	.38**	17–92
Education	3.24	2.79	2.95	2.60	2.78	5.10	5.22	.41**	1–6
Social Class	2.75	2.79	2.92	2.64	2.71	2.96	2.97	.13*	1–5
Number of Cases	(606)	(68)	(107)	(73)	(151)	(39)	(72)	(1,122)	

*significant at the .05 level; **significant at the .01 level.

If these incentives indeed do account for the party-participation relationships seen in table 1, then we expect the following to hold:

1. The incentives for political action should have higher values for supporters of the Greens than for adherents of the SPD and CDU.
2. Strong party identifiers should perceive more positive incentives for campaigning and legal protest than weak identifiers.
3. Nonidentifiers should perceive more positive incentives than CDU identifiers for legal and illegal protest behavior.

Table 2 shows that these predictions are largely confirmed. The means for all public goods-related incentives are consistently higher for the Greens than for all other party groups. For example, the average level of policy dissatisfaction among all Greens is 15.76 on a 20-point scale, over four points higher than the nearest other group, the Social Democrats, at 11.66. In contrast, the average policy dissatisfaction of CDU identifiers is extremely low (7.45), with nonidentifiers around the middle of the scale (10.93). Greens identifiers also show the largest values for perceived personal influence, likelihood of group success, and belief in principles of collective rationality than other party groups. Finally, perceptions of the moral justifiability of legal and illegal political action are substantially higher among the Greens than all other parties.

The relationship between party support and the social network and psychological incentives is also significant, and again the Greens register particularly high values. Expectations of others to engage in legal and illegal protest are highest for Green identifiers, as are the number of memberships in groups that encourage legal and illegal action, perceptions of personal development, and the entertainment value of participation. Only the material incentives show no clear relationship to party identification. In general, the analysis shows that CDU identifiers perceive the least positive incentives for participation, Greens the most, with SPD identifiers in the middle of the scales.

Our second prediction addresses the fact that weak identifiers engaged in legal political action to a lower extent than strong identifiers. Accordingly, the means of the relevant positive incentives for these behaviors should be lower for weak than for strong identifiers. These patterns are confirmed in our data. Analysis of variance of all the incentives (for identifiers only) shows that strength of identification shows a consistently significant main effect on the public goods-related incentives, and is sporadically significant for the material and social-psychological incentives for legal protest. For the illegal protest incentives, however, strength of party identification is for the most part irrelevant, again mirroring the findings from table 1.

The final prediction attempts to account for the relatively high extent of political protest registered by nonidentifiers through differential perceptions

of positive behavioral incentives. This prediction is also confirmed by our data. Nonidentifiers are almost as high on policy dissatisfaction as SPD identifiers. The pattern for the influence terms, moral justifications for violence, and the expectations of others is similar, as nonidentifiers are higher than CDU identifiers and often weak SPD identifiers as well.

These findings parallel precisely the differential rates of protest participation for the various groups seen in table 1: Greens perceive the most positive incentives, followed by SPD identifiers and nonidentifiers with any party, with CDU identifiers perceiving the fewest positive incentives for legal and illegal protest. This suggests that much of the party-participation relationship may be explained by these incentives, if those variables are strongly associated with participation in collective political action. It is also evident from table 2 that members of various groups differ substantially in their relative age, educational attainment, and social class. Thus when accounting for the relationship between party support and political participation, we will also control for these potentially relevant demographic factors.

Party Identification, Incentives, and Collective Political Action

The decisive test for comparing the direct effect of party identification on participation and its correlated effects through public goods and other incentives is to assess the extent to which party identification remains significant in predicting participation once the incentive variables are taken into account. To examine this, we first constructed six dummy variables to denote weak or strong identification with the CDU, SPD, and Greens; identification with no party thus is the base line against which the party effects are measured. We then estimated four regression models for each mode of political action: a model including only the party dummy variables; a model consisting only of the incentives variables; a model including both sets of variables; and finally, a model that includes the demographic variables as statistical controls. To the extent that the relationship between identification and political action is completely spurious, we expect that the coefficients of the identification variables should be insignificant after including the effects of the incentives. The effects of the incentive variables, however, should be stable after adding the party dummies and the entire incentives model should not be altered substantially once demographic factors are controlled. We present the results of these analyses for campaigning in table 3a, for legal protest in table 3b, and for illegal protest in table 3c.

For all tables, a model with only the party dummy variables is shown in column 1, a model with only the incentives variables is shown in column 2, a model with both sets of variables is shown in column 3, and the full model with demographic variables included is in the final column. The results for

TABLE 3A

THE EFFECTS OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND INCENTIVES ON CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION

Variables	Party Alone (1)	Incentives Alone (2)	Party Plus Incentives (3)	All Variables (4)
Party Identification				
CDU Weak	.05		.06	.07*
	.04		.04	.05
CDU Strong	.16**		.11**	.13**
	.14		.10	.11
SPD Weak	.09		.03	.07*
	.07		.02	.05
SPD Strong	.24**		.09**	.13**
	.25		.10	.14
Green Weak	.34**		.15**	.09*
	.14		.08	.05
Green Strong	.40**		.17**	.12**
	.21		.12	.09
Public Goods Incentives				
Instrumental Public		.033**	.028***	.029**
Goods Motivation		.16	.14	.14
Normative Public Goods		.012**	.011**	.005**
Motivation		.20	.18	.09
Material Incentives				
Negative Sanctions		−.01	−.01	−.00
		−.03	−.03	−.01
Financial/Occupational		−.01	.00	−.01
Gains		−.01	.00	−.02
Social Network Incentives				
Expectations of Others		.03***	.04**	.02**
		.12	.12	.08
Group Encouragement		.10**	.09**	.08**
		.20	.17	.16
Meeting People		.01	.02	.01
		.04	.04	.02
Psychological Incentives				
Gaining Knowledge		.02	.02	.02*
		.04	.05	.05
Entertainment		.06**	.05**	.05**
		.20	.18	.16
Demographic Variables				
Age				−.002**
				−.11
Education				.04**
				.19
Social Class				.01
				.03
Adjusted *R*-Square	.10	.35	.38	.42

Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients; standardized coefficients underscored. Number of cases for all equations is 1,122.

*significant at the .05 level, two-tailed; **significant at the .01 level, two-tailed.

TABLE 3B

THE EFFECTS OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND INCENTIVES ON LEGAL PROTEST

Variables	Party Alone (1)	Incentives Alone (2)	Party Plus Incentives (3)	All Variables (4)
Party Identification				
CDU Weak	−.02		.02	.04
	−.02		.02	.03
CDU Strong	.01		.03	.06*
	.01		.03	.05
SPD Weak	.03		−.01	.03
	.03		.00	.02
SPD Strong	.15**		.04	.07*
	.18		.04	.08
Green Weak	.42**		.22**	.18**
	.20		.13	.11
Green Strong	.50**		.17**	.14**
	.30		.14	.11
Public Goods Incentives				
Instrumental Public		.025**	.023**	.021**
Goods Motivation		.15	.14	.13
Normative Public Goods		.016**	.014**	.010**
Motivation		.31	.26	.19
Material Incentives				
Negative Sanctions		−.01	−.02	−.01
		−.03	−.04	−.02
Financial/Occupational		.01	.02	.00
Gains		.02	.03	.01
Social Network Incentives				
Expectations of Others		.04**	.04**	.03**
		.16	.15	.12
Group Encouragement		.09**	.08**	.08**
		.20	.18	.17
Meeting People		.02	.01	.01
		.05	.04	.02
Psychological Incentives				
Gaining Knowledge		.01	.02	.01
		.04	.05	.04
Entertainment		.02**	.02**	.02**
		.09	.08	.07
Demographic Variables				
Age				−.003**
				−.16
Education				.02**
				.11
Social Class				.02
				.04
Adjusted *R*-Square	.14	.43	.46	.49

Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients; standardized coefficients underscored. Number of cases for all equations is 1,122.

*significant at the .05 level, two-tailed; **significant at the .01 level, two-tailed.

TABLE 3C

THE EFFECTS OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND INCENTIVES ON ILLEGAL PROTEST

Variables	Party Alone (1)	Incentives Alone (2)	Party Plus Incentives (3)	All Variables (4)
Party Identification				
CDU Weak	−.03		−.00	.00
	−.05		−.01	.00
CDU Strong	−.04*		−.01	.00
	−.08		−.02	.00
SPD Weak	.00		−.02	−.01
	.01		−.03	−.01
SPD Strong	−.00		−.00	.00
	−.01		−.01	.01
Green Weak	.22**		.09**	.08**
	.22		.10	.09
Green Strong	.26**		.10**	.08**
	.34		.14	.13
Public Goods Incentives				
Instrumental Public		.035**	.029**	.027**
Goods Motivation		.16	.13	.13
Normative Public Goods		.017**	.014**	.013**
Motivation		.34	.29	.26
Material Incentives				
Negative Sanctions		−.01	−.01	−.01
		−.04	−.04	−.04
Financial/Occupational		.00	.01	.01
Gains		.02	.03	.04
Social Network Incentives				
Expectations of Others		.03**	.03**	.02**
		.22	.19	.15
Group Encouragement		.06**	.05**	.05**
		.12	.11	.11
Meeting People		.00	.00	−.00
		.02	.01	−.01
Psychological Incentives				
Gaining Knowledge		.01	.01	.01*
		.04	.04	.05
Demographic Variables				
Age				−.001**
				−.14
Education				.00
				.03
Social Class				.01
				.02
Adjusted R-Square	.17	.40	.42	.44

Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients; standardized coefficients underscored. Number of cases for all equations is 1,122.

*significant at the .05 level, two-tailed; **significant at the .01 level, two-tailed.

all tables are similar, as the effects of party identification are diminished considerably after inclusion of the incentives into the models.[11] For example, table 3b shows the results for participation in legal protest. Here the identification model, with dummy variables representing each party group, shows significant effects of strong SPD and strong and weak Green identification over the baseline group of nonidentifiers for protest behavior. Taking the incentives into account in the full model, however, renders the strong SPD effect insignificant, diminishes the unstandardized effects of party identification with the Greens by more than 50%, and results in relatively weak standardized beta coefficients for each of the party dummies. In contrast, the coefficients of the incentives variables remain essentially stable after the addition of the party dummies in column 3. Finally, the inclusion of education, age, and class into the full model does not have much effect: while age and education have significant independent effects on protest participation, the incentives variables remain relatively unchanged, and the effects of Green identification are reduced by only a slight margin from model 3.

Further evidence of the relatively minor direct effect of party identification is seen by comparing the explained variation in the various models. The incentives model shows an adjusted *R*-squared value of .43, and adding all six dummy variables corresponding to party identification improves the explained variance by .03. Conversely, the addition of the incentives variables over the party variables alone improves the adjusted *R*-squared by approximately .32. Inclusion of demographic factors also increases adjusted *R*-squared over model 3 by only .03.[12] Thus, the direct effect of party identification on legal protest behavior is quite small, with the large majority of the simple relationship explained through the public goods incentives, social network, and psychological incentives.

The same general pattern holds in tables 3a and 3c for campaign participation and for illegal protest, with one difference. After controlling for the demographic factors in the campaign model, all party group dummies show a significant (though substantively weak) effect on participation, indicating that identification *per se* with political parties has some net impact for conventional campaign activities. But in general, the conclusions of all three tables are consistent: the effects of identification with all party groups are reduced

[11] In each model, the relevant incentives that are included pertain to the type of behavior in question. That is, for the campaigning and legal protest models, we include the incentives for legal action, and for the illegal protest model we include the incentives for illegal protest.

[12] If the demographic factors are entered first in the legal protest model, followed by the incentives variables, the increase in adjusted *R*-squared solely attributable to the incentives is .15, compared to .03 for the demographics. Thus the bulk of the explanatory power in table 3b is due to the variables in the incentives model. The relative impact of the incentives in table 3a is .14, compared to .04 for the demographic factors, and in table 3c is .16 compared to .02 for demographics. Thus we conclude that the effects of incentives in accounting for the party-participation relationship are not spurious, due to the joint influence of age and education.

substantially after inclusion of the incentives variables. For protest participation in particular, identification with the Greens shows a significant net effect, even after controlling for all other specified influences. This indicates that the public goods and other incentives can explain a large part, though not all, of the relationship between Green identification and protest. Some direct impact remains, and in accord with our theoretical discussion, we interpret this effect as the result of individuals conforming to the behavioral expectations of the party, independent of preferences for public goods, moral justifications, or other perceived incentives.

Discussion

We have extended previous research on party identification and political action by examining the effects of party support on both conventional and unconventional participation. We found that the traditional pattern of identifiers engaging in political activities more than nonidentifiers held only for conventional campaign behavior. For legal and illegal protest, large differences in behavioral rates between party groups were found, and nonidentifiers were more likely to participate in these forms of behavior than all groups except for Green and strong Social Democratic identifiers. Thus, the simple relationship between party identification and political participation differs substantially by behavioral type.

We proposed a party incentives model to account for these differences, and found consistent support for its predictions. Specifically, party groups that showed high rates of participation in a given form of behavior also showed high values on relevant incentives that led to behavior: public goods-related incentives, such as policy dissatisfaction, perceptions of individual and group influence, and adherence to moral beliefs justifying legal or illegal collective action; and other incentives such as conforming to the behavioral norms of others and deriving entertainment from taking part in politics. These incentives explained almost completely the differences in protest participation between nonidentifiers and identifiers with the "established" political parties, the CDU and SPD. For the Green party, however, a significant direct net effect of identification, both weak and strong, remained even after controlling for all other variables. We interpret this direct effect as reflecting the extent to which Green party identification in itself is an incentive for participation, based on the individual's attempts to conform with the behavioral expectations of the party and to follow the behavioral cues of the party leadership.

The results have important implications for theories of political participation and of party identification. The findings indicate that two types of incentives, public goods and social network rewards, represent the most powerful direct motivations for individual participation in collective political action.

Individuals participate in political action primarily based on their assessments of the likely consequences of their action in achieving policy goals, in adhering to internalized moral beliefs that justify or proscribe certain forms of behavior to achieve those goals, and in conforming to the behavioral norms of other individuals and groups in their social networks. The effects of the purely psychological incentives, especially in the nonelectoral behavior models, are trivial, and material costs and benefits are consistently irrelevant. The core public goods and social network incentives explain a large part of the variance in all forms of behavior, and are also able to explain to a very large extent the relationship between other theoretically relevant variables and political participation. Demographic factors have some net impact on participation, but their effects, as with party identification, are largely mediated through the variables in the incentives model.[13] These results are consistent with recent research that attempts to explain the relationship between participation and other variables such as postmaterialist values, and suggests the relative primacy of the public goods and social network incentives as direct influences on individual behavior (Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989; Opp 1989; Opp 1990).

For theories of party identification, the results here suggest that models of the relationship between party identification and political behavior need considerable modification. Parties do not necessarily integrate individuals into institutionalized electoral behaviors; they can mobilize their followers to engage in unconventional protest behaviors as well. Yet neither are parties *necessary* mobilizing agents for protest, since, given the proper mix of positive public goods and other incentives, nonidentifiers will participate at equal or greater rates than some party adherents. The keys to participation, we have shown, are the incentives themselves, and to a very large degree the relationship between party identification and behavior will depend on the perceptions of these incentives among particular groups of party supporters and nonidentifiers.

This is not to suggest that the observed relationship between party identification and incentives relevant for political participation is accidental. On the contrary, party identification can represent in itself an incentive for participation, if the party encourages a particular form of behavior. Further, party identification and the public goods-related incentives are theoretically bound together by what might be called "ideological consonance." If by "ideology" we mean "a verbal image of the good society and of the chief

[13]The bivariate correlations between the demographics and protest are all substantially larger than their standardized effects in the multivariate models of table 3. For example, the correlation between age and illegal protest is −.37, while the standardized effect of age on illegal protest in the multivariate model is −.14. Similarly, the correlation between education and legal protest is .42, while the standardized effect of education in the multivariate model is .11.

means of constructing such a society" (Downs 1957, 96), then our category of public goods-related incentives neatly represents this dimension. Individuals who identify with a party therefore exhibit strong preferences for certain public goods, and accept their party's moral views with regard to how these public goods should be realized.

It is unclear, however, to what extent the incentives are the cause or the effect of partisanship. Certainly social network processes may lead individuals to identify with particular parties, as may a given mix of political grievances and the instrumental and normative beliefs that comprise our public goods incentives. At the same time, party groups and other organizations that mobilize for protest may successfully influence individuals' levels of discontent, perceptions of efficacy, and moral justifications for behavior, in order to stimulate higher levels of participation. Thus, party identification, public goods, and social network incentives should be mutually reinforcing, and we leave to future longitudinal research the task of disentangling their precise causal relationship.

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Appendix

Measurement of Participation and Instrumental Public Goods Motivation

We describe here the construction of the legal and illegal protest, campaign participation, and variables that comprise the compositive public goods term used in this analysis. All but the campaigning scale are identical to those used in Finkel, Muller, and Opp (1989), and the campaign scale follows the procedures outlined there with variables related to campaign behavior. The reader is referred to the earlier article for more details, and for the relationship of each of the individual scales to both legal and illegal protest.

Measurement of Political Action Variables

The dependent variables of *legal protest* and *illegal protest* were measured following a procedure developed by Muller (1979). Respondents were questioned about their past perfomance of a series of legal and illegal behaviors ("never," "once," "several times") and about their future intention to perform these behaviors (five categories, from "not at all" to "very likely"). The set of legal items includes: sign a petition; take part in a permitted demonstration; wear a button or a sticker for a political cause; work with a citi-

zens' action group; collect signatures for a petition. The illegal items include: take part in a demonstration that breaks the law; seize buildings, e.g., factories, government or university offices; participate in confrontations with police or other governmental authorities; participate in political activities that may result in property damage (e. g., breaking windows or damaging construction sites or vehicles); participate in protest activities at the work place which are against the law (e.g., wildcat strike, sabotage, slowdown, etc.); participate in confrontations with other political groups or individuals; seize building sites; take part in public disorders (e.g., blocking streets, sit-ins, etc.).

To ensure anonymity, these questions were asked in the form of a self-administered questionnaire, which the respondent placed in a separate envelope that was sealed and given to the interviewer.

Each behavior response was multiplied by the respective intention response. The resulting product terms were subjected to a factor analysis (unweighted least squares, varimax rotation) for the whole sample. Two factors were extracted, one exhibiting high loadings only of the legal protest product terms, the other showing high loadings only of the illegal protest product terms. A legal protest scale and an illegal protest scale were constructed by adding the product terms of the legal and illegal items respectively and dividing each scale by the number of items. Due to skewed distributions, especially of the illegal protest scale, the scales were logged taking the base 10.

Two items referring to *campaigning*—attending a political meeting or rally and working for a political party or candidate in an election campaign—were included in the above mentioned self-administered questionnaire along with the legal/illegal items. The campaign scale was constructed in the same way as the protest scales: each behavioral item was multiplied by the respective intention code, the resulting product terms were added and divided by 2. Because of the skewed distribution, the variable was logged.

Measurement of Preferences for Public Goods

Respondents were asked to what extent they were concerned about the following issues: (1) extent of crime, (2) extent of unemployment, (3) the differences between rich and poor, (4) the cost of living, (5) problems in the community of the respondent, (6) environmental pollution, (7) nuclear power stations, (8) deployment of missiles, (9) number of foreigners. There were five response categories, from "not at all concerned" (coded 0) to "extremely concerned" (coded 4). For each issue the respondent was asked to rate the government's performance, again using five categories, from "excellent" (coded 1) to "very poor" (coded 5). If the respondent thought that dealing with the issue was not a task of the government, the value 0 was assigned.

For each issue, measures of concern and dissatisfaction with government performance were multiplied. A high value of a product term means that a

respondent is both concerned about an issue and dissatisfied with the respective policies of the government. This method of measuring policy dissatisfaction is similar to the procedure used by Barnes et al. (1979) and Muller (1979).

The nine product terms were subjected to a factor analysis (ULS with varimax rotation). Two factors were extracted. On the first factor, the items (2), (3), and (6) to (8) exhibited relatively high loadings (higher than .60), whereas (4) and (5) showed relatively low loadings; on the second factor the items (1) and (9) loaded highly. The items (2), (3), and (6) to (8) were added to form a Policy Dissatisfaction scale, which was then divided by the number of items, and thus ranges from 0 to 20.

Measurement of Personal Influence

Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they *personally* could influence politics if they were to perform the following campaign activities (c), legal actions (l), and illegal actions (i): working for a political party or candidate in an election campaign (c); collecting signatures for a petition (l); working with a citizens' action committee (l); seizing buildings (i); blocking streets or participating in sit-ins (i). Five response categories, ranging from "would have no influence" to "would have great influence" were presented. Three scales, influence by campaigning, legal protest, and by illegal protest, were constructed by adding the respective items. The summary indices were transformed to scales of 0 to 1, so that they can be interpreted as probability estimates.

Measurement of the Likelihood of Group Success

We constructed three scales measuring group influence separately for campaigning, legal, and illegal protest by multiplying measures referring to past group success and willingness of others to participate in legal/illegal protest and campaign activities. Since we assume that the effect of past group success on protest and campaigning depends on the number of others perceived to be willing to become active, we improved previous measures of group influence by including items designed to tap this concept.

To measure *past group success* respondents were asked to indicate to what extent the following legal and illegal actions of political groups in West Germany have helped their cause: collecting signatures (l); taking part in legal demonstrations (l); seizing buildings (i); blocking streets or participating in sit-ins (i); participating in confrontations with police or other government authorities (i). There was no corresponding campaign item. There were five response categories, ranging from "hurt a lot" to "helped a lot." Scales representing past group success by legal protest, and past group success by illegal protest were constructed by adding the respective items, dividing the scale by the number of items, and transforming the value range to go from 0 to 1.

To measure the *willingness of others to participate*, respondents were asked to estimate how many people living in their area with political views similar to their own would be willing to get involved in the following activities: working for a political party or candidate in an election campaign (c), collecting signatures for a petition (l), working with a citizen's action committee (l), seizing buildings (i), blocking streets or participating in sit-ins (i). The response categories were "none," "some," "a few," "many," and "almost all." Three scales were constructed analogous to the past group success scales, only in this case the value range is from 1 to 5.

The three general *likelihood of group success* measures—for legal and illegal protest and campaigning—were constructed by multiplying the measures of past group success and willingness of others to participate. For campaigning we used only the "willingness" question. The scales were transformed so that values go from 0 to 1, where high values mean that the probability of group success is perceived to be high.

Measurement of Principles of Collective Rationality

This scale includes two items that tap individual's perceptions of the strategic and ethical necessity of the participation of all group members in collective political action. To measure the strategic dimension, we averaged the responses to two items: (1) for groups to have a reasonable chance of success by means of political actions everyone must contribute a small part; (2) every individual member is necessary for the success of a political group, no matter how large it is. To measure the ethical dimension, we used one item that refers to the duty to participate, "If a citizen is discontented with the policies of the government, he has a duty to do something about it." This item also ranges from 0 to 1 on a five-point scale. The *collective rationality* scale was constructed by averaging the responses to the strategic and the ethical items.

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