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The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy and Political Support: Evidence from a West German Panel

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This paper explores the effects of four modes of political participation—voting, campaigning, peaceful protest, and aggressive behavior—on two fundamental attitudes, political efficacy and regime support. Theories of democratic participation argue that positive effects should be seen for at least the first three modes, while little is known about the effects of political violence. Using longitudinal data from the mid-1970s in West Germany, it becomes apparent that these modes of participation have vastly different effects on these political orientations. Voting is found to influence regime support in a positive fashion, while campaign activities influence feelings of political efficacy. Peaceful protest has little effect on either attitude, and aggressive behavior has strong negative effects on regime support. The results are discussed in light of theories of democracy which predict developmental effects of political activity, and in light of previous research which investigates these effects in other countries and in other contexts.

Democratic theorists have long grappled with a host of issues related to political participation—its desirability, its feasibility, its proper extent and its impact. To a very large extent, different responses to these issues depend in turn on differing beliefs concerning the role or function of participation for society, for government, and for the individual citizen. For many theorists, participation is seen as a largely instrumental act, one whose purpose is to hold leaders accountable, to advance individual interests or preferences or to bring about desired policy outcomes (Parry, 1972). For other theorists, participation is not only instrumental in nature, but also developmental, furthering certain desirable individual qualities and attitudes quite apart from achieving any concrete political objective. These "participatory" or "citizenship" theorists (Pateman, 1970; Thompson, 1970) believe that participation is intrinsically beneficial,

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because it develops many positive, democratic character traits, such as community-mindedness, political self-competence, and satisfaction with decision-making structures, institutions, and outputs. Political action should be undertaken, then, independently of any purely utilitarian or instrumental considerations, and participatory theorists have generally recommended radically higher levels of mass participation than are typical in most contemporary democracies (Mason, 1982; Pranger, 1975; Barber, 1984).

The purpose of this paper is to present some empirical evidence bearing on the claims of the developmental perspective on mass political participation. While hypotheses derived from the instrumental model of participation have frequently been subjected to empirical test (Verba and Nie, 1972; Colby, 1982; Fiorina, 1982; Peters and Welch, 1980), developmental notions have largely been neglected in the empirical literature. There has been little previous work done which investigates the individual-level effects of political participation, or the ways in which various kinds of acts influence political attitudes or orientations (Salisbury, 1975; Shingles, 1975; Finkel, 1985). Does participation lead to self-fulfillment? To increased satisfaction with the political system or political institutions? To higher levels of political competence and skills? If so, what kinds of participation lead to what kinds of attitudinal effects? For whom, and under what circumstances?

This paper attempts to probe the effects of several modes of political participation—voting, campaign activity, peaceful protest, and aggressive political behavior—on two fundamental political attitudes, the sense of political efficacy and generalized support for the political system. Using longitudinal data collected in West Germany in the mid-1970s, reciprocal effects causal models linking each mode of behavior to these attitudes will be estimated, and their effects compared.

West Germany offers an especially interesting setting in which to test these processes. Previous work in this field has analyzed mainly U.S. electoral behavior, and the extension of this work to West Germany will enable comparisons to be made between the U.S. and another highly industrialized Western democracy. While the two countries are similar in many respects, there are also important differences in their political cultures, electoral and party systems, and popular attitudes about democracy which may influence the meaning and consequences of political participation in both settings (Conradt, 1980; Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt, 1981). The German experience with democracy contrasts sharply with the American case, and it will be instructive to consider the impact of participation on democratic orientations in a country with a relatively short-lived, and less deeply rooted, democratic political culture.

The results of the analyses by no means tell a simple story: some modes of political action in West Germany have attitudinal effects and others do not; some effects are similar to American findings and some are not; and some effects are in the predicted direction and others actually contradict participatory theory. The results point to the complex ways that participation and political attitudes interact, ways which have important implications for theories of democracy and democratic political stability.

Hypotheses

What kinds of attitudes are expected to be affected by what kinds of political actions? Scholarly literature does not spell out specific answers, but a brief review of relevant work will allow several hypotheses to be formulated.

In his study analyzing the works of fifteen twentieth-century citizenship theorists, such as Dewey, Cole and Laski, Thompson (1970) identifies two fundamental orientations likely to be affected by participation: legitimacy and self-realization.[1] Participation in politics is thought to make the citizen more likely to consider the institutions, norms and values of a given regime morally proper, to promote an increase in satisfaction with the system as a whole. Through taking part in the decision-making processes of government, the participant begins to see the system as more legitimate, and to accept more readily collective decisions and policy outcomes (cf. Verba, 1961; Almond and Verba, 1963). As Salisbury points out (1975, p. 326), this perspective on politics is not limited to the citizenship theorists; it has been a central tenet of democratic theory from Locke to Schumpeter to Easton. More recently, Ginsberg (1982) and Olsen (1982) have also stressed the legitimizing function of participation, and especially electoral participation, although these scholars would dispute the "developmental" label for this effect. For them, participation is more a means of mobilizing popular support for a regime by "inducing citizens to believe that they are ultimately controlling government" and reinforcing other popular, largely symbolic myths about the democratic process. Whether such effects are truly developmental again seems out of the boundaries of empirical evidence. For the purposes of this study, it suffices to note that effects of participation on regime support or legitimacy are expected from a variety of theoretical perspectives.

The second major effect of participation is thought to be on individual self-realization, a process described in various works as "the testing of the boundaries of one's identity" (Kariel, 1966), the "self-realization of citizenhood" (Pranger, 1975), and the "process by which individuals

[1] Thompson also points to participation's possible effect on political knowledge. In this paper I will deal only with the impact of participation on attitudes, not on knowledge.

actualize their potential" (Mason, 1982). General indicators of this orientation may be an individual's ego strength or self-esteem, (cf. Lane, 1959), but a more purely political indicator may be the sense of political efficacy, or the sense of being capable of acting effectively in the political realm. Political efficacy is seen as the key link between participation and more general feelings of self-development or self-realization, since high levels of efficacy make it more likely that the individuals will participate in the future, and thus develop their character in a more active, effective way in politics and other areas of social life. Mason (1982, p. 41) states that participation operates through political efficacy "as an agent of self-realization," and Thompson (1970, p. 65) agrees that this feeling is also "part of what is meant by self-realization."

While most theorists agree that legitimacy and political efficacy are fostered by participation, there is much less agreement on the types of political action that may be expected to bring about these attitudinal changes. Clearly, voting in a presidential election and participating in a violent political demonstration should not be expected to produce similar impact, yet the theoretical literature is largely silent on this point. Are all forms of participation equally capable of building political efficacy and legitimacy, or are some modes more likely to affect one or the other? Are there in addition some acts which influence these attitudes in a negative fashion?

Previous empirical work has cast considerable doubt on the notion that voting leads to beneficial, "self-realization"-type individual changes. Bennett (1975) found no effects of voting on his measure of political sophistication, and Finkel (1985) similarly found little effect of voting in U.S. elections on internal efficacy, that dimension of efficacy most closely related to the processes outlined in the citizenship theory. The argument in both cases was that only activities which are more demanding in terms of time, resource allocation, and general cognitive activation will be sufficient to produce individual self-development. What results from voting instead is an increase in external efficacy, the sense that the political authorities are responsive to citizen demands, a closely related concept to legitimacy and diffuse political support (Iyengar, 1980).[2] In the U.S., then, voting has been found to exert negligible impact on personal efficacy and significant impact on attitudes about the political system, and in the absence of any contrary theoretical reason, this same pattern may be expected in the West German data.

Campaign activity, following the logic outlined above, may be expected to exert more impact on personal efficacy than voting. As well as demanding more time and resources from the individual, this mode of

[2] These concepts are not identical, though, and, as will be discussed below, a major aim of this paper is to discern the effects of participation on better indicators of regime support.

activity allows more opportunity to affect directly political actions, decisions, and outcomes, and hence may contribute strongly to individual feelings of personal political influence. In addition, certain features of the West German electoral context, such as ideologically diverse and more cohesive political parties, may make campaign participation even more involving than in the United States. Among Americans, this mode of action contributed to internal efficacy in simple bivariate reciprocal models, yet the effects were reduced after introducing education level as a statistical control (Finkel, 1985). It is reasonable, then, to assume that campaign activity will thus exert some impact on efficacy in the West German context as well.

In terms of system support, both theory and previous empirical work support an expectation of positive campaign effects. Individuals who come to participate in this manner must assume to some extent that the electoral process is a legitimate venue to pursue one's political goals. This faith in elections may thus indirectly feed into a general satisfaction with a system which so structures its decision-making processes, and which allows the individual to exert influence in this way. Finkel (1985) shows the strong effect of campaign participation on external efficacy as well, and thus there may be a general expectation of the development of system support through this mode of action.

While the hypothesized effects of conventional political action are relatively straightforward,[3] those for unconventional and aggressive behavior are much less clear. Thompson (1970, p. 81) claims that even these forms of action "probably . . . foster . . . a sense of legitimacy and self-realization" by "giving expression to political interests that might not otherwise be heard." Participants might thus develop a sense that they are able to exert influence within the present system, or that the system itself is perhaps more worthy of support.[4] These expectations, however, may be overly optimistic. It may also be argued that these forms of unconventional behavior arise in large part *because of* low levels of political support and efficacy (Muller, 1979), and that the results of such actions will most likely be reinforcement of alienation and inefficacy, as participants come to view the system and their role in it as less positive after acting against it. A third possibility is that aggressive behavior will

[3] Campaigning and voting by no means exhaust conventional participation; communal activity and local level actions, for example, are also important, and play large roles in theories of democratic participation (Almond and Verba, 1963). Unfortunately, the data analyzed here contain no information on these kinds of activities.

[4] Specifically, Thompson claims that actions "which do not infringe upon other persons' rights" should be ragarded as legitimate, even actions such as "sit-ins, marches, rent strikes and job blockades" (p. 80). Some of these actions are specifically tapped in the aggressive behavior index analyzed here, while others tapped seem to fall in his "illegitimate" behavior category.

have different kinds of effects on efficacy than on support. As this kind of action is highly demanding, time-consuming, and likely to produce visible effects of some sort, efficacy may be positively altered. At the same time, negative support for the system may be reinforced through the experience of having acted in concert with others against it. If this pattern holds true, it would indicate that protest and aggressive action may be developmental in the sense of promoting political self-competence, but still have negative consequences for legitimacy, and ultimately, regime stability.

Methodology

The study here represents a re-analysis of data collected in the mid-1970s for a major research project on aggressive political participation by Edward N. Muller (summarized in Muller, 1979; Muller and Jukam, 1977; and Muller and Williams, 1980). Twelve hundred sixty-one respondents were interviewed in both 1974 and 1976, representing 49% of the original 1974 sample. Probability samples were drawn in twelve sampling sites, six of which were university communities, in order to ensure variation on the protest and aggressive behavior measures.[5] While the data here do pose some problems for generalizability, there are several features of the study design which make it especially useful for testing the major hypotheses outlined above.

First, this data set is the only presently available panel study which contains information on both protest and more conventional electoral behaviors such as voting and campaign activity. As the major goal of this paper is to compare the psychological consequences of the various modes of political action, this feature is ideal. Second, there are distinct advantages in analyzing panel data as opposed to more traditional cross-sectional designs. Panel data, while not a cure-all by any means, greatly facilitates the statistical estimation of reciprocal effects between variables. As developmental theories of participation specify reciprocal, mutually reinforcing effects between political attitudes and political action, panel data allows more accurate tests of the theories to be made. Finally, the data set contains a more reliable measure of one key attitudinal variable, political support, than is found in many other surveys. Previous work in the general area has been marred by an inability to empirically distinguish the concepts, following Easton (1965), of specific support for particular leaders or policy outputs from more diffuse support for authority structures, institutions, and regime norms and values. The differences are crucial in predicting various forms of political behavior (Muller, Jukam

[5] Complete information on the sampling procedures of the panel may be found in Muller and Williams (1980), and of the sample in general, in Muller (1979).

and Seligson, 1982), and the differences may be just as crucial in predicting these behaviors' effects. The theories discussed above specify clearly that the effects of participation should be on diffuse political support, as opposed to support for specific outputs or persons occupying authority roles. The measure of support used in this study taps unambiguously the notion of legitimacy, or diffuse support for the regime, and this clarification will greatly enhance the interpretation of the results.

Measures of Participation

Voting. Elections were held in the Federal Republic in 1972 and 1976, and a simple "Did you vote in the Bundesrepublik election of 19--?" was used to tap participation in each. While the 1974 question did ask for the respondent to recall actions taken two years earlier, it is not expected that this introduced much error into the analysis, due to the extremely high turnout rates found in these two West German elections.

Campaign Activity. This mode of participation was indexed by summing responses to the following five items:

Have you spoken with or attempted to persuade people to vote for a particular party or candidate?
Have you carried a poster or placed a sticker on your car?
Have you attended a political meeting or rally?
Have you spent any money to support a candidate or party?
Have you done any work to help a candidate in his race?

Responses were coded "0" for never, "1" for once or twice, and "2" for more often. These items correspond quite closely to the questions used in American studies, and they exhibit similar high reliabilities as well. The 1974 campaign scale shows a reliability (alpha) of .80, and the 1976 value is .76, indicating that these items hang together as a reasonably cohesive mode of political participation. The sample mean for this scale in 1974 is 1.6 (standard deviation 2.49) and for 1976, 1.36 (standard deviation 2.2).

Protest. The measures of protest and aggressive behavior follow the logic of the specifications set forth by Muller (1979), and involve a complex summation of responses to questions tapping behavior and behavioral intention for each type of activity. For the protest dimension, respondents were asked questions about "participating in a peaceful demonstration," and were scored as "0" if the respondent reports that (s)he has not yet done and would never do it, "1" if (s)he has not already done but might or definitely would do it, and "2" if (s)he has already done it but would not do it again, and "3" if (s)he has already done it and would do so again. In 1974, 49% say they have not and would not do this (41% in 1976), 25% haven't done this but might (41%), 2% have done it but wouldn't do it again (1%), and 24% have and would do it again (18%).

Aggressive Behavior. Similar codings were done to construct the index for behavior that involves violence or illegal actions. The questions tapped whether the respondent had

occupied factories, offices or other buildings,
refused to pay rent or taxes,
participated in violent demonstrations (fought with police or other demonstrators),
participated in a group that wanted to dislodge the government through violent means, or
participated in a wildcat strike.

This scale has been carefully validated by Muller (1979). In this sample, 72% report no aggressive acts in 1974, and 68% none in 1976. The mean in 1974 is .78 acts (std. dev. 1.62), and in 1976, .87 (std. dev. 1.64).

Measures of Political Attitudes

Diffuse political support. This scale is a multi-item index constructed from responses to the eight questions put forward by Muller (1979, pp. 80-81) to tap the extent to which the norms, values and institutions of the regime, "in general conform to a person's sense of what is right and proper."[6] Responses were coded from 7, the most "supportive" answer, to 1, the most "alienated" response, and the scale created by summing the eight responses together. Muller and Williams (1980) report reliabilities of .76 in 1974 and .78 in 1976, again indicating a reasonably cohesive scale. In this sample, the 1974 value for support was 32.8 (std. dev. 8.38) and the 1976 value was 35.84 (std. dev. 8.52).

Efficacy. The measure of political efficacy used in this study is the response to the single question, "Do you think that you have a great influence, a moderate amount of influence, hardly any influence, or no influence at all on the manner in which the Federal Republic (FRG) is governed?" Unfortunately, the data set does not contain the standard political efficacy questions used in most empirical research. However, this question appears to tap unambiguously the internal efficacy component, in that it is asking directly about the perceived influence capacity of the individual, the sense that (s)he is capable of exerting influence on

[6] The eight items are: (1) It makes me concerned when I think about the difference between what people like me value in life and what actually happens in our political system. (2) I have great respect and affection for the political institutions in the Federal Republic. (3) My friends and I feel that we are quite well represented in our political system. (4) I find it very alarming that the basic rights of citizens are so little respected in our political system. (5) At present, I feel very critical of our political system. (6) The courts in the Federal Republic guarantee everyone a fair trial regardless of whether they are rich or poor, educated or uneducated. (7) Looking back, the leading politicians in the Federal Republic have always had good intentions. (8) Considering everything, the police in the Federal Republic deserve great respect.

governmental actions. Its wording corresponds most closely to the item, "People like me have no say in what the government does," which is frequently used in research to tap the internal efficacy dimension. In 1974, the distributions for this question were: great influence, 1%; moderate influence, 11%; hardly any influence, 48%, and no influence, 40%. In 1976, the corresponding figures were 1, 15, 54 and 30 percent.

Control Variables. Besides including measures of participation and political attitudes, the statistical model will include several control variables which have been shown in previous research to be linked with the main variables of interest. Because these variables—for example, age and education—are likely to be correlated with efficacy, support, and political participation, failure to include them in the models will result in erroneous causal inferences. In addition, in panel models the failure to include relevant controls may exacerbate the problem of non-independent error terms, and for both these reasons, background variables were entered into the model directly. Four variables were included—education level, age, ideology (coded so that high numbers are more right-wing, low numbers more left-wing), and subjective social class. All have been identified in previous research in West Germany to have some impact on the attitudes and behaviors of interest in this study (Baker et al., 1981; Conradt, 1980).

FIGURE 1

MODEL LINKING PARTICIPATION (P) AND EFFICACY OR SUPPORT (A) OVER TIME



Model Specification. The basic model which will be estimated is shown in figure 1. On the left side of the model are the control variables, which are treated as predetermined, or exogenous to the causal process outlined between participation and the political attitudes. Each control variable is hypothesized to affect each of the dependent measures, the circled participation modes (labelled "P") and either efficacy or support (labelled "A" for attitude), at both points in time. These effects are represented by the "g" coefficients.

The interrelationship between the attitude and participation variables is initially modeled to follow a cross-lagged causal pattern: participation in 1974 is hypothesized to affect both participation and the corresponding attitude in 1976 ("b3" and "b1," respectively), and the attitude dimension in 1974 is hypothesized likewise to influence itself and the participation measure in 1976 ("b4" and "b2"). Finally, the error terms of the participation and attitude equations in each year ("e1" through "e4") are assumed to be correlated, and these effects are represented by the "u" coefficients.

The cross-lagged model is the most basic which can be specified with a two-wave panel, and the one which depicts the reciprocal causal effects idea in the most intuitive fashion. It is also essentially equivalent to a synchronous model where participation and attitudes act on each other in the same year, with no effect from one variable to another over time (and which Finkel [1985] estimated in the American case). In general, the pattern of effects between cross-lagged and synchronous models is similar, and in no instance reported below would a choice of a synchronous effects model have produced different substantive conclusions. However, it may be possible that both cross-lagged and synchronous effects are present, such that attitudes and behavior affect one another in the future as well as during the same time period. Models which incorporate both types of effects are much more statistically complex, and will be estimated and discussed only when there are demonstrable reciprocal causal links in an initial cross-lagged model.

All coefficients were estimated with the LISREL V package (Joereskog and Sorbom, 1981), which in the present instance produces results very similar to those estimated through Three Stage Least Squares regression procedures. The system of equations depicted in figure 1 yields a just-identified statistical model, and hence chi-square values and goodness of fit measures produced by LISREL in over-identified models do not apply. In later models, the chi-square statistic, which basically represents a summary measure of how well the model *as specified* is able to reproduce the variance-covariance matrix of the variables in the model, will be used to compare the adequacy of alternative causal structures. LISREL also produces a squared multiple correlation for each equation predicting each

endogenous variable, and this "pseudo-R Squared" will be helpful in assessing the goodness of fit of a particular equation.

Models which link the four modes of participation with each of the two attitude dimensions are initially estimated and compared. Then, in several instances, the analysis is extended to compare effects across two relevant sub-groups, young and old respondents. Previous research in West Germany has shown strong generational differences in attitudes and behaviors, and it is possible that the effects of participation may be different for these groups as well (Muller, 1979; Baker et al., 1981). Taken together, the results will indicate first whether these modes of participation have any impact on political attitudes whatsoever; second, whether the types of action undertaken have any appreciable differences in impact; and third, whether the effects are stronger or weaker for different meaningful subsections of the population.

Results

Tables 1 through 4 present the results of the eight models linking the four modes of participation with efficacy and political support. Both unstandardized and standardized coefficients are reported, standardized for comparing the strength of effects within a given model, and unstandardized for later comparisons of the relative magnitude of sub-group effects. Starred coefficients are significant at the .05 level, given a two-tailed test. The results will be discussed sequentially for each mode of participation, from voting, the most conventional behavior, to aggressive behavior, the most unconventional.

Effects of Voting. Tables 1a and 1b show the LISREL estimates of the voting and attitude models. As can be seen in table 1a, the act of voting appears to be completely unrelated to perceived influence or personal efficacy in the German context. Neither the voting-to-efficacy link nor the efficacy-to-voting link reaches statistical or substantive significance. Whatever explained variance exists for each of these variables in 1974 is due to the exogenous factors, and in 1976 to these factors plus some small stability effects, not to the impact of voting and efficacy on each other.

Age is the strongest background variable, exerting a small positive influence on voting (older persons tend to vote more than young), and a small negative effect of efficacy (the young tend to be slightly more efficacious than the old). Class and education yield essentially insignificant effects of all endogenous variables, although the effects are all in the appropriate directions (higher-class and more highly educated people are more likely to vote and feel efficacious). Left-leaning individuals appear to be very slightly more likely to vote and more efficacious as well.

TABLE 1

VOTING, EFFICACY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT

		(a) EFFICACY		(b) SUPPORT	
		UNSTD.	STD.	UNSTD.	STD.
b1	Vote-->Attitude	.06	.02	.38*	.07
b2	Attitude-->Vote	.003	.02	.01*	.09
b3	Vote-->Vote	.08*	.12	.06*	.10
b4	Attitude-->Attitude	.19*	.19	.33*	.34
g1	Age-->Vote (74)	.001*	.08	.01*	.08
g2	Age-->Attitude (74)	-.004*	-.10	.01*	.20
g3	Age-->Vote (76)	-.000*	-.07	-.00	-.06
g4	Age-->Attitude (76)	-.003	-.06	.01*	.10
g5	Class-->Vote (74)	.01	.04	.00	.02
g6	Class-->Attitude (74)	.04	.04	.12*	.09
g7	Class-->Vote (76)	.00	.02	.00	.01
g8	Class-->Attitude (76)	.03	.03	-.06	-.04
g9	Education-->Vote (74)	.01	.02	.00	.05
g10	Education-->Attitude (74)	.01	.05	-.06*	-.18
g11	Education-->Vote (76)	-.00	-.01	.00	.01
g12	Education-->Attitude (76)	.01	.03	-.04	-.13
g13	Ideology-->Vote (74)	-.01*	-.06	-.01*	-.07
g14	Ideology-->Attitude (74)	-.01	-.02	.01	.01
g15	Ideology-->Vote (76)	.00*	.07	.00	-.03
g16	Ideology-->Attitude (76)	-.01	-.02	.02	.04
u1	Vote (74)-->Attitude (74)	.01	.05	.01*	.05
u2	Vote (76)-->Attitude (76)	.002	.03	.01*	.07
	R^2 (Vote [74])		.01		.01
	R^2 (Attitude [74])		.02		.09
	R^2 (Vote [76])		.02		.02
	R^2 (Attitude [76])		.05		.22
	N		(754)		(826)

In short, the model shows that voting does not have impact on personal feelings of political influence, a result which replicates previous analyses from the U.S. (Finkel, 1985). However, in West Germany, voting does not stem from either efficacy or from social background factors which explain their levels in the American context. This is not altogether surprising in high-turnout European elections (Goel, 1980).

Table 1b presents the results of an identical model linking voting with legitimacy, or regime support. In contrast to the efficacy model, here voting and legitimacy are estimated to have reciprocal causal influence, with voting influencing levels of support only slightly less strongly (beta=.07) than support influences voting (.09). While both effects are

small in magnitude, they are present after controlling for several relevant background variables, and are consistent with past research and theoretical expectations. For their part, the exogenous variables also exhibit effects consistent with prior expectations: age and class are positively associated with political support, while education is negatively associated with this attitude.

Further analyses were conducted to test for the presence of both synchronous and cross-lagged causal effects. While the simple addition of reciprocal effects between voting and support in 1976 renders the model underidentified, it is possible to identify the model by examining the pattern of effects from the exogenous variables to the 1974 voting and support measures. Table 1 shows that class and education exert significant impact on support but not the vote, while ideology affects the vote but not support. Eliminating the nonsignificant causal effects enables the exogenous variables to be used as instruments to estimate both cross-lagged and synchronous effects. In addition, the model is now overidentified, and the adequacy of both causal specifications may be assessed through LISREL's chi-square.[7] In the present instance, the analysis shows that both kinds of effects are not operating. While a cross-lagged only model registers a chi-square of 24.1 with 7 degrees of freedom, a model with both effects improves the fit to only 22.65, a nonsignificant improvement given the loss of 2 degrees of freedom. We conclude that the cross-lagged model best captures the causal processes at work between voting and regime support.

Effects of Campaign Activity. Tables 2a and 2b present estimates of the impact of campaign activity on the two attitudes. Table 2a shows that campaigning and efficacy have reciprocal causal links: those who are more efficacious are more likely to campaign, and those who campaign are more likely to feel efficacious as a result. In fact, the standardized effect of campaigning to efficacy (.13) is over twice as large as that of efficacy to voting (.05). The background variables themselves again follow

[7] Specifically, LISREL compares the observed variance-covariance matrix of the variables in the model with the matrix which is implied by the hypothesized model itself, and this difference is captured by the chi-square statistic. To the extent that chi-square is large, relative to its degrees of freedom, the model as specified does not account for the observed data very well. When different models are nested within one another, i.e. when one model can be obtained from another by constraining certain parameters to be zero, the two models may be compared directly with a chi-square difference test. Here, the cross-lagged only model is nested within the cross-lagged and synchronous model (by constraining the synchronous effects to be zero). The difference in chi-squares between the two models follows a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to their difference in degrees of freedom. If the chi-square difference is significant at the .05 level, it may be concluded that the revised model represents a better fit to the data. For more details, see Carmines and McIver (1983).

theoretical expectations: the young, more highly educated and more left-wing individuals tend to participate in this form of activity (Barnes and Kaase, 1979, chs. 3 and 12).

TABLE 2

CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY, EFFICACY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT

		(a) EFFICACY		(b) SUPPORT	
		UNSTD.	STD.	UNSTD.	STD.
b1	Campaign-->Attitude	.17*	.13	-.03	-.01
b2	Attitude-->Campaign	.04*	.05	.02*	.05
b3	Campaign-->Campaign	.47*	.52	.46*	.52
b4	Attitude-->Attitude	.17*	.17	.35*	.35
g1	Age-->Campaign (74)	-.002*	-.07	-.002*	-.07
g2	Age-->Attitude (74)	-.004*	-.09	.01*	.20
g3	Age-->Campaign (76)	.002*	.06	-.002*	.06
g4	Age-->Attitude (76)	-.002	-.05	.01*	.11
g5	Class-->Campaign (74)	.03	.04	.003	.004
g6	Class-->Attitude (74)	.07*	.08	.11*	.08
g7	Class-->Campaign (76)	.01	.01	.01	.01
g8	Class-->Attitude (76)	.07	.01	-.01	-.01
g9	Education-->Campaign (74)	.06*	.38	.06*	.38
g10	Education-->Attitude (74)	.01	.04	-.06*	-.19
g11	Education-->Campaign (76)	.02*	.14	.02*	.14
g12	Education-->Attitude (76)	-.01	-.02	-.06*	-.18
g13	Ideology-->Campaign (74)	-.05*	-.19	-.05*	-.18
g14	Ideology-->Attitude (74)	-.01	-.02	.03*	.05
g15	Ideology-->Campaign (76)	-.01*	-.05	-.01*	-.05
g16	Ideology-->Attitude (76)	-.00	-.00	.02	.04
u1	Campaign (74) <-->Attitude (74)	.07*	.19	.03*	.05
u2	Campaign (76) <-->Attitude (76)	.02*	.07	.04*	.07
	R^2 (Campaign [74])		.27		.24
	R^2 (Attitude [74])		.03		.10
	R^2 (Campaign [76])		.44		.43
	R^2 (Attitude [76])		.06		.25
	N		(858)		(922)

Again, the pattern of effects from the exogenous variables allows us to test alternative causal processes which may exist. Here, because class affects efficacy but not campaign action, while education and ideology both influence campaign participation but not efficacy, an overidentified model can be obtained by constraining those effects to be zero. The chi-square difference between this revised cross-lagged and synchronous

model and a cross-lagged only model is 7.1 with 2 degrees of freedom, and this represents an improvement in fit significant at the .05 level. An examination of the standardized causal effects in the revised model shows that the lagged effect of participation on efficacy is .07, slightly smaller than the synchronous effect of .10. The synchronous effect of efficacy on participation, on the other hand, is only .01, while the lagged effect remains at its original .05 level. We conclude that for this model, participation exerts both a lagged and direct effect on feelings of political efficacy; campaign action reinforces feelings of political self-competence at the time of the behavior, and its effects persist into the future as well.[8]

In table 2b, it can be seen that campaigning has no impact whatsoever on regime support. While this attitude exerts a small, statistically significant influence on campaign participation (those higher on support are more likely to campaign), there is no feedback from the behavior onto later levels of political support. This finding is somewhat surprising, as it differs from the American analysis where campaign action was seen to have similar effects on support as voting. However, the measure used to tap political support in the American study was the "external efficacy" scale, which taps support for authorities and their responsiveness to citizen demands, rather than broad-based support for regime institutions or norms (Craig and Magiotto, 1982). Campaign activity, the purpose of which is expressly to change or perpetuate the authority structure, may indeed have effects primarily on that level, and not have effects which spill over onto general regime values.

Effects of Protest. Thus far, only conventional behaviors have been analyzed. The next set of models investigates the interrelationships between efficacy, support and two modes of unconventional participation, peaceful demonstrations or protest and political violence, and even further differences in attitudinal effects will be seen. Tables 3a and 3b present the results of the efficacy, support, and protest models. In neither model is the effect of participation in a peaceful demonstration a significant influence on the relevant political attitude. Participation is seen to be the result of higher levels of efficacy (although the effect is marginal in magnitude—beta=.04) and of lower levels of political support (a slightly higher beta of -.14). In addition, the background factors influence protest in predictable fashions, with younger, more highly educated and more left-leaning respondents more likely to engage in this form of action.

[8] One problem with estimating a model with both synchronous and cross-lagged effects is that multicollinearity can render the individual coefficients statistically insignificant, while the joint effect of the lagged and synchronous term is significant (Kessler and Greenberg, 1981, p. 45). In the present instance, neither individual effect of participation on efficacy is significant, but a model without either effect is clearly a worse fit to the data (chi-square difference of 13.2 with 2 df). Thus, jointly, participation significantly affects efficacy directly and lagged over time.

TABLE 3

PROTEST, EFFICACY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT

		(a) EFFICACY		(b) SUPPORT	
		UNSTD.	STD.	UNSTD.	STD.
b1	Protest-->Attitude	-.03	-.06	-.02	-.02
b2	Attitude-->Protest	.07	.04	-.14*	-.14
b3	Protest-->Protest	.26*	.31	.27*	.31
b4	Attitude-->Attitude	.24*	.24	.35*	.34
g1	Age-->Protest (74)	-.01*	-.13	-.01*	-.11
g2	Age-->Attitude (74)	-.004*	-.10	.01*	.18
g3	Age-->Protest (76)	-.01	-.16	-.01*	-.13
g4	Age-->Attitude (76)	-.002	-.04	.01*	.13
g5	Class-->Protest (74)	.04	.03	.01	.003
g6	Class-->Attitude (74)	.02	.03	.10*	.07
g7	Class-->Protest (76)	.10*	.07	-.08*	.06
g8	Class-->Attitude (76)	.00	.00	.05	.03
g9	Education-->Protest (74)	.18*	.50	.19*	.51
g10	Education-->Attitude (74)	.02*	.09	.06*	.20
g11	Education-->Protest (76)	.08*	.27	.07*	.23
g12	Education-->Attitude (76)	.02*	.08	.04*	.13
g13	Ideology-->Protest (76)	-.10*	-.16	-.10*	-.17
g14	Ideology-->Attitude (74)	-.004	-.01	-.02	-.04
g15	Ideology-->Protest (76)	.05*	-.09	-.06*	-.11
g16	Ideology-->Attitude (76)	.003	-.01	-.03	-.06
u1	Protest (74) <-->Attitude (74)	.09*	.10	.10*	.07
u2	Protest (76) <-->Attitude (76)	.06*	.08	.07*	.06
	R^2 (Protest [74])		.42		.41
	R^2 (Attitude [74])		.06		.10
	R^2 (Protest [76])		.39		.41
	R^2 (Attitude [76])		.07		.25
	N		(808)		(791)

Interestingly, the signs of the participation to attitude effects are not even in the predicted direction. Peaceful protest did not contribute to higher levels of efficacy and support, but instead exhibits very weak effects in the opposite direction. These effects, however, are both statistically insignificant and extremely small in magnitude, and thus no substantive claims of the impact of this mode of unconventional behavior can be made.

Effects of Aggressive Political Participation. Tables 4a and 4b contain the results of the aggressive political participation (APP) and attitude models. As can be seen, the effects of this mode of action are in the same direction, and in the support model are quite stronger than for the somewhat milder

mode of protest. For the efficacy model, the effect of APP, as with protest, on that attitude is also negative, although it still fails to attain statistical significance. At the same time, aggressive behavior is not the result of high levels of efficacy, as with all the other modes of action. Here a (statistically insignificant) negative effect is seen, such that those who feel politically powerless are slightly more likely to participate in this type of behavior. This finding is in agreement with Muller's (1979) analysis of the same data.

For the support model, though, there exist strong and significant reciprocal causal effects between this attitude and aggressive behavior. Not only is APP the result of low levels of diffuse support, as Muller clearly shows in a series of studies (Muller, 1979; Muller and Jukam, 1977), but

TABLE 4

AGGRESSIVE PARTICIPATION, EFFICACY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT

		(a) EFFICACY		(b) SUPPORT	
		UNSTD.	STD.	UNSTD.	STD.
b1	APP-->Attitude	-.02	-.04	-.09*	-.14
b2	Attitude-->APP	-.05	-.02	-.25*	.16
b3	APP-->APP	.29*	.31	.25*	.26
b4	Attitude-->Attitude	.22*	.23	.31*	.31
g1	Age-->APP (74)	-.02*	-.14	-.02*	-.14
g2	Age-->Attitude (74)	-.01*	-.11	.01*	.17
g3	Age-->APP (76)	-.01*	-.14	-.01*	-.11
g4	Age-->Attitude (76)	-.002	-.05	.01	.10
g5	Class-->Vote (74)	.01	.002	-.03	-.01
g6	Class-->Attitude (74)	.004	.01	.13*	.09
g7	Class-->APP (76)	.02	.01	.05	.02
g8	Class-->Attitude (76)	.003	.004	.03	.02
g9	Education-->APP (74)	.17*	.34	.17*	.34
g10	Education-->Attitude (74)	.02*	.09	-.06*	-.20
g11	Education-->APP (76)	.11*	.23	.09*	.18
g12	Education-->Attitude (76)	.01*	.06	-.03*	-.09
g13	Ideology-->APP (74)	-.18*	-.21	-.18*	-.21
g14	Ideology-->Attitude (74)	-.01	-.02	.01	.01
g15	Ideology-->APP (76)	-.07*	-.08	-.08*	-.10
g16	Ideology-->Attitude (76)	-.01	-.02	.01	.02
u1	APP (74) <-->Attitude (74)	-.03	-.02	-.32*	-.18
u2	APP (76) <-->Attitude (76)	.01	.01	-.16*	-.09
	R^2 (APP [74])		.27		.26
	R^2 (Attitude [74])		.04		.09
	R^2 (APP [76])		.32		.32
	R^2 (Attitude [76])		.07		.23
	N		(722)		(697)

also this form of action reinforces these low levels themselves in a circular causal pattern. The effects are very similar in magnitude in both directions, and are among the strongest standardized effects seen in the study thus far. Other effects, from the exogenous variables, are in appropriate directions—younger, more highly educated and more left-wing individuals are more likely to participate aggressively in politics.

Again, alternative models with synchronous effects were estimated, as the pattern of effects from the exogenous variables allowed the specification of these more detailed causal structures. Class and ideology affect only support and aggressive behavior, respectively, and a simple cross-lagged only model with these effects eliminated yields a chi-square of 12.0 with 5 degrees of freedom. A revised cross-lagged and synchronous model improves the fit significantly to .56 with 3 degrees of freedom, indicating that both types of effects are present. Examination of the standardized effects shows a similar pattern as in the campaign model; aggressive behavior exerts a slightly stronger synchronous effect (.19) than a cross-lagged effect (.10) on regime support, while there is only a lagged effect of support on aggressive behavior (.17). Thus the feedback of aggressive protest on lower levels of regime support is felt directly and two years later as well.[9]

The results from the two unconventional participation models, in general, show a far different pattern of effects than from the two electoral-related conventional behavior models. For political violence, especially, the main attitudinal effects are a decrease in regime support and a decrease in political efficacy, while for peaceful demonstrations the effects are weak and insignificant, but in the same direction. For electoral related behavior, the main effects are precisely the opposite in psychological terms, as conventional behavior leads to an increase in support for the regime (in the case of voting) and more feelings of personal influence (in the case of campaign behavior).

Sub-group Analysis. While the conclusions reached above apply for the sample taken as a whole, it is possible that participation has different effects on various social groups. In the U.S., for example, education had such an interaction effect, in that voting and campaigning had the largest impact on external efficacy among lower-educated respondents (Finkel, 1985). In West Germany, an especially likely interaction is with age, because the youngest cohort (less than 30 years old in 1974), has numerous distinctive political orientations (Baker et al., 1981). This cohort was socialized almost entirely in the Federal Republic democratic era, with

[9] Again, significance tests show that neither individual effect is significant, but a model without either effect of aggressive behavior on support is a significantly worse fit to the data (chi-square difference of 15.2 with 2 df). Thus the joint effect of participation and the lagged participation term significantly alters regime support.

no psychological residue from either the Nazi or Weimar era, and this fact in itself may yield important differences in the way these respondents react to political participation. In addition, because this cohort has developed most strongly the attitudes of post-materialism and anti-establishment sentiment (Barnes and Kaase, 1979, ch. 11), it is possible that participation in aggressive behavior in particular may have stronger anti-regime consequences for this group, as they are more psychologically predisposed to developing these orientations. At the same time, participation in conventional action may not be as fulfilling or developmental, since this group may not have as much faith in the traditional parties and electoral system as a venue for citizen influence.[10]

TABLE 5

COHORT DIFFERENCES IN CAUSAL EFFECTS

	FULL SAMPLE		YOUTH		NON-YOUTH	
	UNSTD.	STD.	UNSTD.	STD.	UNSTD.	STD.
Voting-->Support	.38	.07	-.04	-.01	.71*	.12
Support-->Voting	.01	.09	.01	.06	.01*	.08
N		(826)		(183)		(643)
Campaign-->Efficacy	.17*	.13	-.00	-.01	.24*	.16
Efficacy-->Campaign	.04*	.05	.01	.00	.05*	.09
N		(858)		(226)		(632)
APP-->Support	-.09*	-.14	-.09*	-.18	-.07*	-.09
Support-->APP	-.25*	-.16	-.29*	-.14	-.19*	-.15
N		(697)		(174)		(523)

To investigate this possibility, the sample was divided into two groups, the youth cohort and the remaining respondents. The models for all tables with a significant effect from a participatory mode to an attitude were re-estimated for both groups separately, and the results are shown in table 5 in simplified form. At the top of table 5 are the estimates of the reciprocal links between voting and regime support, in the middle those between campaigning and personal efficacy, and at the bottom those between aggressive behavior and regime support. The results of the sub-group comparisons indicate clearly that differential effects for the modes of participation exist depending on the age cohort of the respondent.

[10] The youngest cohort is also likely to be more highly educated—the correlation between education and age is -.55.

As can be seen, the attitudinal effects of conventional modes of participation are evident only for the older cohorts; there is absolutely no impact from voting to regime support, or from campaigning to efficacy for the under-30 generation. In contrast, the effects for the older cohorts are strong and statistically significant. The unstandardized effects for these cohorts are many times stronger than those for youth and for the sample as a whole, and the standardized effects are also relatively large.

For the aggressive behavior model, the differences between cohorts are less pronounced, but there is a slightly larger negative effect of political violence on regime support among the young than the old. Both effects, though, are still significant and approximately equal to the full sample's estimate. The standardized effect of APP on support is almost twice as large for the youth cohort than for the others, but this difference is probably due more to the larger variance in the APP measure among this cohort than to any large substantive difference in effects.

What is clear from this table is that the different generations react somewhat differently to conventional and unconventional behavior. Younger cohorts seem much less susceptible to the developmental effects of mainstream political action, and slightly more susceptible to the antisystem effects of unconventional acts. Thus while young cohorts participate in campaign acts to a larger degree than their elders, and in voting at only a slightly lower rate, these actions do not result in individual attitude change in terms of either legitimacy or political efficacy. Because they are not as well integrated into the norms of the system in general, they do not develop positive regime attitudes even after participating in "within-system" political behaviors.

Discussion and Conclusions

This study was undertaken to investigate the causal interrelationships between several modes of participation and two fundamental political attitudes, efficacy and support for the political system. From several strands of contemporary democratic theory, it was hypothesized that participation in politics is not only caused by these political orientations, but also feeds back onto the attitudes in a reciprocal causal fashion. The results of the study confirm this general notion: there do exist reciprocal causal relationships between several modes of participation and these two attitudes. What is most striking, however, is not this overall conclusion, but rather the fact that different patterns of effects exist for different modes of action, and for different types of citizens. This conclusion has important implications for the various theories of democracy discussed earlier, as well as for empirical research which investigates the causes and correlates of political participation.

The results of the voting model suggest that this form of participation, aside from any instrumental benefit or purpose it entails, has significance as an input of support for the entire political system. Voting does serve to make the individual feel more positively toward the institutions of government, and the norms and values that they embody. The finding here replicates the U.S. analysis (Finkel, 1985), indicating that this may be a very general process in western democracies. In West Germany, in particular, this process may have been especially important in building higher levels of diffuse support for the regime since the founding of the Federal Republic.

At the same time, voting in West Germany, as in the U.S., had minimal effects on the individual's sense of political efficacy, suggesting that this mode of action is not a means of developing political self-competence or skills. Voting is not a means of personal empowerment, as had been hypothesized by Thompson (1970) and other citizenship theorists, and thus cannot be justified on these kinds of developmental grounds.

The mode of behavior most in accord with the processes outlined by citizenship theory appears to be campaign activity. This was the only mode of action which had positive consequences for political efficacy, the indicator of self-realization used here. Given that campaigning is more cognitively demanding than voting, and puts individuals in direct contact with conflicting political ideas and goals, this result makes eminent theoretical sense. Those individuals who contribute time, effort and resources to work for the election of a candidate do not, then, derive only instrumental benefit (or loss) from their candidate's winning or losing; in addition, they "become more familiar with the system and develop ties, [and] become more confident of [their] ability to achieve political results" (Thompson, 1970, p. 66). This new self-perception, then, makes future participation more likely, and it is precisely this developmental process which leads citizenship theorists to advocate more and more mass participation in electoral contests.

These individual-level effects of conventional action also quite clearly have beneficial consequences for regime stability. High efficacy and high support were, in this analysis, negatively correlated with aggressive behavior. Thus, since voting and campaign actions each promote higher levels of one of these attitudes, they may co-opt, or prevent more violent or regime-challenging acts. The effects of conventional participation in the West German and American settings therefore go beyond both instrumental considerations and individual psychological development; they may also have importance as a cushion for the regime against violent challenges to its existence.[11]

[11] This same idea has been shown on the macro-level in Powell (1982, ch. 8), by entering voting turnout rates into equations predicting political violence across countries.

The same process is decidedly not true for the two unconventional modes of behavior investigated here, participation in peaceful demonstrations and aggressive political behavior. While some theorists did expect positive attitudinal effects for even these modes of action, since they are cognitively demanding and time-consuming, and may take place within existing structures, the evidence presented here portrays these modes of action as qualitatively different in their consequences for efficacy and support. The effects of these modes of action on efficacy were in the opposite direction from that predicted, but these effects were not statistically significant. Both made the individual less supportive of the regime, strongly and significantly so in the case of APP. Acting violently against the regime or those who occupy authority roles emphatically does not inculcate positive system orientations; rather such actions tend to increase the feelings of alienation and powerlessness that contribute to the actions themselves. For this reason, normative theorists may not endorse unconventional participation, even peaceful protest, on these "developmental" grounds.[12]

Several important questions remain for future research. First, to what extent do these findings hold across countries, time and sub-groups? That is, do voting and campaigning generally induce positive support and efficacy, and do protest and violence generally foster the opposite? Or do these effects reflect only specific national conditions at a specific historical moment? While a tentative generalization was made concerning the effects of voting on regime support, it is possible, for example, that voting for a non-mainstream, anti-Establishment party (such as the German Greens) may not have similar consequences for political support, or that voting for the Greens in 1983, when they first attained parliamentary representation, may be different from voting for them now, as they have been serving within the system for several years. Evidently, the findings reported here may hold only under specific structural conditions (e.g., center-dominated two-party or three-party system), and it is the task of future research to delineate what those conditions are and when they will most likely apply. It is also possible that the variations in effects seen here for age groups may represent a highly specific pattern associated with a particular period in western societies, one which saw the development of post-materialism among its youth on a large scale, and a concomitant anti-establishment orientation that predisposed them

[12] This does not by any means preclude endorsement of protest or violence on instrumental grounds, or for the possible development of other attitudes, for example, group consciousness or solidarity, which may be highly desirable. Also, theorists sympathetic to political violence in a given context may advocate such actions in order for individuals to weaken their attachment to the state. My statement here says only that unconventional behavior should not be seen as a means of enhancing feelings of personal political influence or support for the institutions, norms or values of the regime.

towards rejecting the norms associated with conventional political action. Again, future research is needed to test this explanation, not only among youth, but also for other sub-groups, such as minorities or women, who may be expected to react differently to various modes of political action (Shingles, 1975).

Second, the results here raise the possibility that psychological effects of political action may represent an incentive for individuals to participate. Developing efficacy or altering regime support may be part of the individual's expected benefits from participation, and may thus contribute to predictive models of behavior in addition to absolute levels of efficacy or support. In the models above, these psychological consequences are a by-product of participation; if intended, the results are relevant not only for developmental theories of participation, but also for rational choice models which seek to explain participation through expected "psychological utility" (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Muller and Opp, 1986).

What can be stated most convincingly from this study is that various modes of participation and certain fundamental political attitudes are reciprocally related, and that models of individual behavior must take these processes into account. Future research should delineate more fully their scope and place in both normative and empirical theories of political participation.

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