Civic Education and the Mobilization of Political Participation in Developing Democracies

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This article examines the effect of adult civic education programs on political participation in two developing democracies, the Dominican Republic and South Africa. I first develop hypotheses about the effects of civic education on participation from theories of political culture and recent work on recruitment and group mobilization. Using survey data collected on participants in numerous civic education programs as well as control groups in both countries, I then show that civic education has significant and substantively meaningful effects on local-level political participation in four of the seven programs studied in South Africa and the Dominican Republic and that the results hold after controlling for potential biases related to the individual's self-selection into the programs. The effects of civic education on participation are largely conditional in nature, dependent on the frequency and nature of the civic education "treatment," and the individual's store of prior political and participatory resources. The results suggest that civic education and other group mobilization processes are highly complementary in both countries; civic education training stimulates individual political behavior in much the same way as does participation in other kinds of secondary group activities.

Introduction

Can individuals in emerging democracies learn democratic values, skills, and participatory orientations through civic education? Presumably the United States and many West European countries believe the answer to be yes, since they have devoted considerable resources over the past several decades to civic education as part of their larger efforts to provide democracy assistance and strengthen civil society in emerging democracies around the world (Carothers 1996, 1999; Diamond 1995; Quigley 1997). Civic education programs in these contexts range from the adoption of new curricula in primary and secondary schools to teach young people about democracy, to programs that provide instruction about the social and political rights of women, to voter education

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programs, to neighborhood problem-solving programs that bring individuals in contact with local authorities for purposes of promoting collective action to benefit local communities.

Until recently, however, little effort has been made to assess the impact of civic education programs on their target populations. There is an extensive literature on the effectiveness of school-based civics education among children and young adults (e.g., Morduchowicz et al. 1996; Niemi and Junn 1998; Slomczynski and Shabad 1998; Torney-Purta et al. 2001). Only in the last several years have efforts begun to evaluate the impact of civic education on the democratic values, attitudes, and activities of ordinary citizens who take part in these programs (Bratton et al. 1999; Finkel, Sabatini, and Bevis 2000).

In this article I assess the effects of adult civic education programs on political participation. Recent research documents the low levels of social and political participation in many developing democracies (e.g., Booth and Richard 1998; Bratton 1999), so such an investigation has the important practical goal of illuminating whether civic education is a promising means for stimulating greater citizen engagement in the political process. The results can also uncover the conditions under which civic education is most (and least) effective, thereby providing critical information to policy makers and donors regarding the kinds of programs and methods that appear to be most capable of influencing ordinary individuals to take part in politics.

Aside from these obvious practical concerns, however, examining the effect of civic education on political participation has several more general theoretical aims. First, the results can shed light on the extent to which democratic values and behaviors are affected by short-term experiential factors, as opposed to the more traditional view that changes in democratic orientations are likely to occur slowly due to long-term economic modernization, generational changes, the activities of political parties and governmental actors, and the gradual diffusion of democratic norms through the international mass media (Almond and Verba 1963; Eckstein 1988; Gibson, Duch, and Tedin 1992; Weil 1989). Second, the examination of the civic education-participation relationship can provide an important extension of recent theories that stress the role of group memberships, recruitment, and mobilization in determining mass political action in developing democracies (Booth and Richard 1998; Bratton 1999; McDonough, Shin, and Moises 1998). As opposed to the classroom-based civics training that students receive in school systems throughout advanced and developing democracies, adult civic education in most democratizing contexts is conducted almost exclusively through secondary group associations. Hence, the investigation of civic education's effect on political participation provides a means of assessing the ways that the appeals contained in civics programs are reinforced and amplified by other group-related mobilization processes.

In this article, I present findings from survey data collected on participants in numerous civic education programs and control group respondents in two emerging democracies, the Dominican Republic and South Africa. I show that

civic education has significant and substantively meaningful effects on local-level political participation in four of the seven programs studied and that the results hold after controlling for potential biases related to the individual's self-selection into the programs. Moreover, the effects of civic education on participation are largely conditional in nature, dependent on theoretically relevant variables such as the frequency and nature of the civic education "treatment," and the individual's store of prior political and participatory resources. The results suggest that civic education and other group mobilization processes are highly complementary in both countries; civic education stimulates individual political behavior in much the same way as does participation in other kinds of secondary group activities.

Theoretical Perspectives

How much impact on political participation and other democratic orientations are civic education (CE) programs likely to have? According to traditional views, change in democratic political culture should occur very slowly, primarily in response to structural factors such as economic modernization (e.g., Lipset 1959), generational replacement and socialization processes (Almond and Verba 1963; Dalton 1994; Inglehart 1990; Jennings and Van Deth 1990), or the long-term experience of citizens with rotations of power and a responsible opposition structure among the country's political parties (Weil 1989, 1993). A steady stream of findings over the past several decades, however, has shown that more immediate variables such as the individual's perceptions of current economic conditions, assessments of governmental competence, and experiences with governmental authority can affect orientations such as support for democratic values, social and institutional trust, and political efficacy (e.g., Brehm and Rahn 1997; Dalton 1994; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Mattes and Thiel 1998; Mishler and Rose 1997; Rose and Mishler 1994). Mishler and Rose (1997, 434), for example, posit what they call a "lifetime learning model" in which attitudes learned early in life are continuously updated as these "early attitudes and beliefs are reinforced or challenged by subsequent experiences." Clearly, such a view allows a greater *potential* influence of civic education as another short-term experiential effect on the individual's overall orientation to democratic politics.

Recent political participation research provides even more optimism that civic education may have a significant impact specifically on the individual's level of engagement with the political system. Following Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995), much work has emphasized clearly the role of active mobilization efforts by parties, secondary groups, and social networks in stimulating individual political behavior (e.g., Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992; Knoke 1990; Leighley 1996), with such effects being at least as important in democratizing as in more developed democratic contexts (Booth and Richard 1998; Bratton 1999; Gibson 2001).

This emphasis on recruitment and mobilization in the participation literature has clear implications for the analysis of the impact of civic education. Of course, to the extent that classroom-based or more formal forms of civic instruction contain appeals to take part in politics, we may conceive of any type of civic education as one characterized by "political mobilization." But there is a deeper relationship between adult civic education and political mobilization in developing democracies. Civic education in these contexts is conducted primarily through secondary groups and associations, sometimes by labor, church, or trade associations, but more frequently by what Carothers (1999) refers to as "advocacy NGOs" (or nongovernmental organizations). These groups, with names such as *Grupo Acción por la Democracia* in the Dominican Republic, *Lawyers for Human Rights* in South Africa, and *Constitutional and Reform Education Consortium* in Kenya, are public interest or reformist groups that are funded by the U.S. and European donors in the hopes that they can become part of a "diverse, active, and independent civil society that articulates the interests of citizens and holds government accountable" (Carothers 1999, 87). To this extent, *civic education in developing democracies is intimately bound up with processes of group political mobilization*, as advocacy NGOs utilize civic education as a means for stimulating individuals to participate in group activities, strengthening their membership base, and thereby furthering the group's political goals. As such, the effects of advocacy-based civic education on political participation may be quite substantial, as the "normal" appeals of civics training to participate in politics are augmented and amplified by group-related mobilization dynamics.

Hypotheses

This linkage of civic education with group mobilization processes suggests three different mechanisms by which civics training may lead to increased political participation. We may classify these mechanisms as the *direct*, *indirect*, and *conditional* effects of civic education on participation, with each figuring prominently in the group mobilization literature. First, CE should exert a *direct* effect on behavior, as participants will be exposed to both participatory appeals contained in the civic education curriculum as well as to potentially powerful behavioral cues emanating from group leaders and other group members (Finkel and Opp 1991; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Further, the advocacy NGOs themselves may differ in the extent to which they directly encourage political participation among their members, as some groups place greater emphasis on other issues such as economic development, labor, or women's and family rights (Carothers 1999). We may therefore expect that the stance of the group regarding the desirability of participation should be an important determinant of the subsequent political behavior of the individuals they train through civic education.

Second, we may expect *indirect* effects of civic education on political participation, as democracy training may influence other attitudes, values, and per-

ceptions that feed into subsequent political participation. These indirect effects are likely to be especially powerful in group-based civic education, as a wealth of previous research suggests that involvement in voluntary associations affects precisely the same orientations, such as trust, efficacy, and civic skills, that are expected to influence subsequent participation (Booth and Richard 1998; Bratton 1999; Pollack 1982; Putnam 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Thus, the curricular goals of civic education may join the group-based nature of the programs to produce the expectation of indirect effects of civics training on democratic political participation.

Third, we may expect that civic education will also have *conditional* effects on participation, as the impact of group-based programs may differ depending on variables related to the individual's specific civic education experience and on variables related to the individual's demographic and political characteristics. As scholars since Verba and Nie (1972) have found that active group involvement has greater mobilization effects than passive group membership (Leighley 1996; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Pollack 1982), we may hypothesize first that individuals who are more actively involved in civic education efforts within the group will be more likely to be influenced by both the curricular aspects of civics training and the other group processes that may stimulate participation. We should therefore observe greater effects on participation among individuals who attend more frequent civic education sessions within the group.

But "active involvement" in civics education efforts may go beyond simply attending more frequent training sessions. Much research in social psychology suggests that a significant source of attitudinal and behavioral change is role-playing behavior within groups as individuals come to adopt attitudes and cognitions that are consistent with the behaviors that they are acting out (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975, Chap. 10; Zimbardo and Leippe 1991, 102–108). From the group mobilization perspective, this process may be likened to the development of participatory skills through group involvement, as individuals "practice" participation through group involvement and learn how to transfer these skills outside the group setting (Leighley 1996; Pollack 1982; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). It may be expected, therefore, that civic education programs that make use of more active methodologies to instruct participants—role playing, dramatizations, group decision making, and the like—will have a greater effect on eventual individual participation than lecture-based instruction.

Finally, the effects of group-based civic education on participation may be greater for certain kinds of individuals than others. Though the goal of many advocacy NGOs conducting civic education is to mobilize dispossessed, marginal, and previously inactive constituencies, it is nevertheless the case that mobilization efforts appear to be most successful among individuals possessing relatively higher levels of resources such as education and political interest, and who are more highly integrated into existing social networks (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and

Brady 1995). Thus, we may hypothesize that among those trained and targeted for mobilization by civic education groups, individuals with higher levels of prior political resources will be more likely to respond to the participatory cues that emanate from both the civic education curriculum and the groups that conduct the training. We may expect, therefore, that the effects of civic education will vary directly with the individual's level of education and political interest and will be greater among individuals who are more active in *other* secondary groups and associations.

All of these effects, moreover, should exist over and above the potential effects of self-selection into civic education programs. That is, it may be the case that individuals who possess higher levels of resources and "participatory predispositions" will be those who are more likely to be targeted for civic education training to begin with or those who are more likely to volunteer to attend civic education sessions regardless of whether or not they were specifically asked to do so. Controlling for the possible confounding effects of self-selection biases will thus occupy a good portion of the empirical analyses below.

Research Design and Measurement

The study examines these processes by comparing the levels of participation observed among individuals trained in four USAID-sponsored civic education programs conducted in the Dominican Republic in the mid- to late 1990s, and three programs conducted in South Africa between 1998 and 1999, with appropriate control groups in both countries. USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance initiated the evaluation of civic education efforts in the Dominican Republic and Poland in 1996–1997, with South Africa added in mid-1998. These countries were selected primarily because of the interest expressed by the Santo Domingo and Pretoria USAID missions in evaluating the civic education programs that had been funded in the preceding years. The studies were conducted through Management Systems International (MSI), a Washington-based consulting firm.[1]

Dominican Republic

The first of the programs studied was conducted by a national elections-oriented NGO, *Participación Ciudadana (PC)*. For the 1996 presidential elections, PC created another group, called *La Red de los Observadores Electorales*, to organize and train youth and adults to serve as election observers in 1996 and to conduct a quick count of the vote. The program ran from 1995 to mid-1996, although PC activities continued into 1997. Of those in the sample, 14% of the respondents were exposed to PC and Red training sessions but did not eventually work as election observers.

[1] For more information on the overall USAID-sponsored civic education evaluation project, see Sabatini, Bevis, and Finkel 1998, and Finkel and Stumbras 2000.

The second program was conducted by a newly formed NGO, *Grupo Acción por la Democracia (GAD)*. The program was conducted in two phases, with the first phase dedicated to a general educational program concerning political rights and obligations in a democracy, primarily through a lecture format. The second phase brought these people together to hold a series of issues forums along with local government authorities to discuss problems and solutions in specific policy areas such as justice, health, and education. The program ran from 1995 through 1996.

The third program was part of a larger community finance and small business development program for women conducted through a women's small business NGO, *Asociación Dominicana para el Desarrollo de la Mujer (ADOPEM)*. The program trained women community leaders in women's rights, democratic values, democracy in the family, and self-esteem using a classroom/workshop format, and it ran from January 1996 to January 1997.

The fourth program studied was conducted by a local NGO affiliated with a local radio station in La Vega, *Radio Santa María (RSM)*. The project trained intermediaries (typically leaders of rural towns) who then conducted civic education in their local communities. The subject matter focused on civic knowledge and values, such as rights and duties in a democracy, the importance of participation, and democracy in the family. RSM ran two consecutive projects, from 1994 to 1995 and from 1995 to December 1996.

In all of the programs in the Dominican Republic except Radio Santa Maria, treatment samples were drawn from lists of participants provided by the implementing organizations. For the Radio Santa Maria program, only lists of the "leaders" or first-stage participants were maintained, and we obtained names of ordinary participants through snowball sampling methods from interviewers with the first-stage participants. The number of individuals interviewed from the four programs totaled 1,018.

The strategy for obtaining appropriate control samples was to select nonparticipants at random in each of the regions where the programs were conducted. The sampling began with a national stratified random sample of 50 municipalities, as the PC program operated nationwide, and GAD operated in all areas except for Santo Domingo, the country's capital. Individuals were selected for inclusion in the sample in proportion to the population of the selected municipality. This control sample was then supplemented with an oversample of individuals in La Vega, where the Radio Santa Maria program operated, and an oversample of women in the four areas where ADOPEM conducted its training. The number of individuals interviewed for the control groups was 1,017. (More details on the design and the participant and control group samples may be found at www.people.virginia.edu/~sef/jop-appendix.htm)

The in-country survey was conducted by the *Instituto de Estudios de Población y Desarrollo*, the statistical office affiliated with PROFAMILIA. Data were collected from February to April 1998. The response rate for the survey was an

excellent 90.5%, with 98% response for the participant sample and 83.7% response for the control group.

South Africa

The South African study included three programs that conducted civic education among black and coloured adults. The first was run by the *National Institute for Public Interest Law and Research (NIPILAR)*. NIPILAR is the primary member of a Consortium operating at the national level in the field of public interest law and rights education with emphasis on women and children's rights, as well as the Constitution and Bill of Rights education. One of the main civic education programs conducted by NIPILAR over the past several years was its Women's Rights program, designed to promote awareness of the UN Women and Children's Rights Convention.

The second program was operated through the *Community Law Centre–Durban (CLC)*. CLC is part of the consortium described above and thus has many of the same goals and activities as NIPILAR. CLC, however, operates almost exclusively within the province of KwaZulu Natal, where NIPILAR does not operate.

The third South African program was conducted by *Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR)*. LHR is a national organization aiming to increase the awareness of human and democratic rights in South Africa. The organization holds an extensive series of workshops yearly on democracy and human rights issues, with different aspects of democracy receiving particular emphasis in different years. Workshops in the period covered in the study emphasized the Constitution and the Bill of Rights and general participation in politics.

The three NGOS operate in generally similar fashion with regard to their civic education activities. Representatives from the central offices train a core group of individuals, called "paralegals," in democracy and human rights instruction. These activities, generally known as Training of Trainers, consume a considerable amount of the group's time and resources. The paralegals then go on to operate offices in villages and towns across the country from which they provide a number of services for individual residents. Some of these services have nothing to do with civic education, for example, providing advice on economic development or labor law. However, the paralegals also conduct frequent community workshops on different aspects of democratic governance and human rights, and these activities are the focus of our study.

As in the Dominican Republic, the treatment group interviews were obtained through sampling lists of civic education participants provided by the three NGOs. Participants were selected systematically from the lists whenever addresses and contact information were provided. In regions where no lists of names and addresses existed, the facilitators or paralegals themselves located the requisite number of participants and provided contact information to the South African survey organization, Markinor, which collected the data.

The control group of nonparticipants in South Africa was designed slightly differently than in the Dominican Republic. Instead of aiming to produce a random sample of the South African black or coloured population, we attempted to introduce more rigorous experimental control at the outset by matching the participant sample on a number of important demographic dimensions. Interviewers were instructed to conduct an interview with a civic education participant selected according to the procedures just described and then to conduct an identical interview in the same area with a person who had not participated in civic education. The control group respondent was to be the same race, gender, and age group as the participant. Interviewers were instructed to make a systematic selection of houses, beginning with the third house from the civic education participant who had been interviewed, in order to find an appropriate nonparticipant for inclusion. More information on the participant and control group samples can be found at http://www.people.virginia.edu/~sef/jop-appendix.htm.

These sampling procedures produced a total of 940 interviews for the study, with the final data collection conducted between May 10 and June 1, 1999. The sample consisted of 475 adult participants in civic education and 475 adult nonparticipants who were matched on race, gender, and age. Ten individuals from the treatment group were eliminated from the analysis because it became unclear in the course of the interview how many workshops they had attended or whether they had been exposed to civic education "treatment" at all.

Measurement of Political Participation

The dependent variable in the analysis in both countries consists of four behaviors that commonly take place at the local or community level: taking part in organized community problem-solving activity; attending a local government meeting; working in an election campaign; and contacting a local elected official. I focus on local-level participation because of the emphasis placed in civic education training on relating abstract concepts about democracy and citizen participation to local-level political issues and institutions. The scale used in the analysis thus runs from zero (no behaviors) to four (all behaviors). The reliability of the scale is .64 in the Dominican Republic and .77 in South Africa.

Independent Variables

I include a number of attitudinal and demographic control variables in the analysis. A series of standard democratic orientations were included as potentially intervening variables in the "indirect effects" model described above: *political knowledge* (0–4 correct responses), *civic skills* (0–2 scale), *political efficacy*, *political tolerance* (both 1–4 scales), and *political trust* (0–6 in South Africa, 0–7 D.R.). I also included a series of standard demographic and political control variables, including educational attainment (1–7 scale), age (5 categories), income (7 grouped categories in D.R., 15 in South Africa), gender

(male = 1), race (black = 1 in South Africa), religiosity (church attendance, 0–5 scale), interest (1–4), media exposure (1–4), previous voting behavior (voted = 1), and the proportion of voluntary organizations out of 10 possible categories (7 in South Africa) to which the individual belongs (0–1). Details on these items and measurement properties of the scales can be found at http://www.people.virginia.edu/~sef/jop-appendix.htm.

Statistical Methods

After presenting the simple bivariate relationships, I estimate models that attempt to isolate the effect of civic education on political participation, controlling for other known determinants of participation, as well as controlling for the selection biases that are inherent in the civic education programs examined in the two countries. The fundamental problem in assessing the effect of civic education on participation (or other democratic orientations) is that in the absence of a pretest and/or randomized assignment of individuals to civic education "treatments," we cannot rule out the possibility that individuals who were trained in civic education workshops already possessed those attributes that correlate with participation or that predisposed them to increased participation in the absence of any "treatment" whatsoever. Indeed those attributes, such as education, group memberships, and political interest, are exactly the factors that may lead individuals to attend civic education workshops in the first place. Thus, any observed difference between civic education participants and the control group on participation many be due to the preexisting differences on these other variables.

The most basic approach for dealing with these selection biases is to include all other variables that are known to be related to both civic education exposure and participation into the statistical model. These variables are entered along with the treatment variables in an OLS multiple regression analysis, which estimates the effect of the treatment on participation after taking into account the differences between the treatment and the control groups on the other variables included in the model. I present these estimates below under the label "Regression Model—OLS."

However, as Achen (1986), Heckman and Robb (1985), and others have shown, there may be differences between the treatment and control group on relevant *unmeasured* variables that influence both the decision to attend a treatment program and the program's desired outcome. For example, individuals who decide to attend civic education workshops may differ from other individuals not only in such observed characteristics as group memberships, educational attainment, and political interest, but also in such unobserved variables as their intrinsic predisposition toward democracy, their motivation to succeed in a democratic society, or their need for sociability. If these factors related to self-selection are also positively (or negatively) related to participation, then estimates of the treatment effect of civic education will be biased, as the esti-

mated regression coefficient for attending civic education would also include some of the effect of these unmeasured variables.

More technically, the problem exists because of the potential for a correlation between the error terms in the *selection equation* (i.e., the decision to attend a civic education workshop) and the *outcome equation* (the prediction of political tolerance), due to unmeasured factors or to random perturbations that influence both the decision to participate and the outcome in question (Berk and Ray 1982; Breen, 1996, 35). To correct this problem, which biases estimates of coefficients in the outcome equation, Heckman (e.g., 1992) has proposed a two-step procedure, also discussed at length in Achen (1986), Greene (1993, 713–174), Vella (1998, 135–38), and Winship and Morgan (1999, 669–87).

In the first step, the decision to participate in the treatment program is modeled via probit analysis. The "generalized probit residuals" (Vella 1998, 136) from this selection equation then become an additional independent variable (λ_i) in the outcome equation, as in:

$$y_i = \beta_k \mathbf{x}_i + \beta_t \mathbf{T} + \beta_\lambda \lambda_i + \epsilon_i$$

where the **x** represents all independent variables that affect the outcome in question, **T** represents the treatment, and the β are respective regression coefficients.[2] It can then be shown that the regression coefficient for the generalized residual term, β_λ, is an estimate of *Rho* (ρ), the correlation between the errors in the selection and outcome equations, multiplied by the outcome equation's standard error of estimate, or ($\rho\sigma_\epsilon$) (Greene 1993). If *Rho* is positive, this means that the "true" effect of civic education on participation will be smaller in the two-step Heckman model than in OLS. If *Rho* is negative, the estimate of the "true" effect of civic education on participation will be correspondingly larger than the estimated obtained in OLS. If *Rho* is statistically indistinguishable from zero, then the unmeasured factors that lead individuals to participate in civic education programs, over and above the variables that are included in the participation equation, are irrelevant for the prediction of participation. In that case the results from what I will refer to as the "self-selection" or "Heckman model" and the OLS regression model will be substantively equivalent. The models were estimated using LIMDEP 7.0.

[2] If the selection equation is denoted as $\mathbf{T}_i = \gamma_k \mathbf{w}_i + \upsilon_i$, where **w** represent a series of independent variables, γ_k their respective regression coefficients, and υ_i is are assumed to be normally distributed, then $\lambda_i = \phi(\gamma_k \mathbf{w}_i)/\Phi(\gamma_k \mathbf{w}_i)$ for the civic education participants ($\mathbf{T} = 1$) and $\lambda_i = -\phi(\gamma_k \mathbf{w}_i)/(1 - \Phi(\gamma_k \mathbf{w}_i))$ for the control group ($\mathbf{T} = 0$), where $\phi(\gamma_k \mathbf{w}_i)$ represents the height of the normal distribution (the probability density) at the point $\gamma_k \mathbf{w}_i$, and $\Phi(\gamma_k \mathbf{w}_i)$ represents the cumulative probability at the same point. λ_i is often referred to as the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR), which decreases monotonically for the treatment group as the probability that $\mathbf{T} = 1$ increases, and decreases monotonically for the control group as the probability that $\mathbf{T} = 0$ increases.

Results

Bivariate Findings

Table 1 displays the simple percentage differences in self-reported participation between individuals who were exposed to civic education in the four Dominican programs and three South African programs, along with the percentages for individuals who received no civic education (the control group).

As can be seen in both countries, there are substantial differences between civic education participants and the control group on all of the political partici-

TABLE 1

Participation by Civic Education Program
Dominican Republic and South Africa

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	***Control Group***	***GAD***	***PC***	***ADOPEM***	***RSM***
Number of Cases	1,019	267	222	211	318
Organized Effort to Solve Community Problem	33%	75%	64%	56%	62%
Attended Municipal Meeting	13%	53%	24%	19%	25%
Contacted Local Official	15%	54%	25%	16%	26%
Volunteered for Local Political Post (Town Council, School Board, etc.)	12%	49%	19%	15%	19%
Overall Participation Scale (0–4)	.73	2.31	1.32	1.07	1.34
Standard Deviation	1.06	1.45	1.20	1.07	1.25

SOUTH AFRICA	***Control Group***	***LHR***	***CLC***	***NIPILAR***
Number of Cases	475	219	99	147
Organized Effort to Solve Community Problem	38%	59%	40%	61%
Attended Local Council/Government Official Meetings	30%	52%	21%	50%
Contacted Local Official	14%	29%	9%	34%
Worked for Party or Candidate in Election Campaign	10%	27%	9%	29%
Overall Participation Scale (0–4)	.92	1.67	.80	1.73
Standard Deviation	1.16	1.40	.96	1.43

Program Names, Dominican Republic:
GAD: *Grupo Acción por la Democracia*
PC: *Participación Ciudadana*
ADOPEM: *Asociación Dominicana para el Desarrollo de la Mujer*
RSM: *Radio Santa María*
Program Names, South Africa
LHR: *Lawyers for Human Rights*
CLC: *Community Law Centre—Durban*
NIPILAR: *National Institute for Public Interest Law and Research*

pation items. Individuals who were exposed to civic education in the Dominican Republic, for example, were roughly twice as participatory as individuals in the control group, with the largest effects being seen for community problem-solving participation and attendance at local municipal meetings. The differences vary substantially between programs as well: GAD participants in particular are extremely active, ADOPEM participants are only somewhat more participatory than the control group, and the two other programs fall in between. On the overall participation scale, GAD participants average a very high 2.31 behaviors (out of 4), over three times the size of the control group's average of .73, while the other program means are roughly 1.5 to 2 times the mean of the control group. Clearly, civic education participants in the Dominican Republic are much more active in a variety of local-level political behaviors than the average Dominican individual, though of course we cannot yet claim that such differences can be attributed to the civic education experience.

Differences of slightly smaller magnitude can be found between civic education participants and the control group in South Africa. In the bottom half of Table 1, it can be seen that participation in two programs—Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) and the NIPILAR women's rights program—is associated with significantly higher levels of participation on each of the four political participation items than the matched control group. Participants in the CLC program, however, which operated exclusively in the politically troubled KwaZulu Natal region, showed no differences in participation over the control group. The differences for LHR and NIPILAR over the control group are of similar magnitude for each participation item, with both LHR and NIPILAR respondents showing participation rates at roughly 1.5 to 2.9 times the control group average. On the overall scale, the control group mean is just under 1 behavior (out of 4 total), with both LHR and NIPILAR respondents reporting between 1.6 and 1.8 behaviors on average. Participants in two of the three South African programs are also more politically active than matched nonparticipants at the local level.

Multivariate Analysis and Controls for Selection Effects

Tables 2A and 2B present the results of multivariate analysis of the effects of civic education on the overall political participation scale in the Dominican Republic and South Africa, respectively. In Model 1 in both tables, the effects of each of the civic education programs are shown, controlling for a series of demographic and political variables that may relate to both political participation and to the likelihood of exposure to civic education. Model 2 displays the effects of the same independent variables in the context of the self-selection model discussed above, which introduces an added control for unobserved factors that may influence both the probability of exposure to civic education and participation. This control variable is denoted as Inverse Mills Ratio (Lambda) in Model 2 in both countries (see footnote 2).

TABLE 2A

The Effects of Civic Education on Political Participation, Dominican Republic

	Model 1 *OLS*		Model 2 *Self-Selection*		Model 3 *Self-Selection with Intervening Variables*	
	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.
Civic Education Programs						
GAD	**.73**	.08	**.71**	.08	**.64**	.08
RSM	**.31**	.07	**.26**	.08	**.31**	.08
PC	.03	.07				
ADOPEM	.03	.08				
Demographic Controls						
Age	.01	.01	.00	.01	.00	.01
Age-Squared	−.01	.01	−.01	.01	−.01	.01
Gender	**.27**	.06	**.27**	.05	**.19**	.05
Education	**−.04**	.02	**−.06**	.02	**−.09**	.02
Income	.03	.03	−.01	.03	−.02	.03
Employed	**.21**	.06	**.16**	.06	**.16**	.06
Church	−.01	.01	−.02	.01	−.02	.01
City	**.10**	.05	**.15**	.05	**.14**	.05
Political Controls						
Group Memberships	**2.17**	.19	**2.37**	.20	**2.26**	.19
Political Interest	**.19**	.03	**.22**	.03	**.18**	.03
Media Use	**.24**	.03	**.23**	.03	**.18**	.03
Voted in 1996	.05	.08	**.23**	.08	**.19**	.08
Democratic Orientations						
Political Knowledge					**.12**	.02
Civic Skills					**.28**	.06
Political Efficacy					.05	.04
Political Tolerance					.04	.03
Trust in Institutions					.01	.01
Inverse Mills Ratio (Lambda)			**.09**	.04	***.07***	.04
Constant	**−1.09**	.24	**−1.48**	.24	**−1.81**	.26
R-Squared	.35		.35		.37	
Number of Cases	2037		2037		2037	

Coefficients in Bold: $p < .05$
Italicized Bold: $p < .10$

The results of these analyses indicate that a significant portion of the bivariate differences between civic education participants and the control group on political participation can be attributed to the selection process; that is, CE participants in general have many of the demographic and political characteristics that predispose them to be more active politically than control group indi-

TABLE 2B

The Effects of Civic Education on Political Participation, South Africa

	Model 1 *OLS*		Model 2 *Self-Selection*		Model 3 *Self-Selection with Intervening Variables*	
	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.
Civic Education Programs						
LHR	**.40**	.09	**.44**	.13	**.33**	.13
NIP	**.47**	.11	**.52**	.14	**.45**	.14
CLC	−.04	.12				
Demographic Controls						
Age	.26	.16	.26	.16	.18	.16
Age-Squared	−.03	.03	−.03	.03	−.02	.03
Gender	**.32**	.08	**.32**	.08	**.24**	.08
Education	**.15**	.03	**.15**	.03	**.06**	.03
Income	.05	.03	.05	.03	.05	.03
Employed	**.17**	.08	**.16**	.08	**.12**	.08
Race	**.29**	.13	**.29**	.12	**.23**	.12
Church	−.03	.03	−.03	.03	−.03	.03
City	***.16***	.09	***.16***	.09	***.14***	.08
Political Controls						
Group Memberships	**1.24**	.16	**1.23**	.16	**1.05**	.16
Political Interest	**.28**	.06	**.27**	.06	**.16**	.06
Media Use	**.15**	.06	**.15**	.06	***.10***	.06
Voted in 1994	***.21***	.12	***.21***	.12	.18	.12
Voted in 1995	−.00	.09	−.01	.09	−.06	.09
Democratic Orientations						
Political Knowledge					**.23**	.04
Civic Skills					.06	.08
Political Efficacy					**.20**	.05
Political Tolerance					.01	.04
Trust in Institutions					.03	.02
Inverse Mills Ratio (Lambda)			−.03	.07	−.01	.07
Constant	**−2.09**	.28	**−2.10**	.28	**−1.77**	.30
R-Squared	.34		.34		.38	
Number of Cases	940		940		940	

Coefficients in Bold: $p < .05$
Italicized Bold: $p < .10$

viduals. In Model 1 in the Dominican Republic, for example, it can be seen that controlling for these factors—in particular the individual's level of involvement in secondary associations, political interest, urban residence, and gender—completely eliminates the observed differences from Table 1 in participation

rates for PC and ADOPEM individuals compared to the control group. Nevertheless, significant differences in overall political participation rates remain for GAD respondents and individuals trained in the Radio Santa Maria program, with the GAD effect of .73 being about one-third of its bivariate value and the RSM effect of .31, about one-half its bivariate size. The effects for both programs in the Dominican Republic are substantively meaningful as well, with CE participation being among the strongest predictors of political behaviors among all variables in the table.[3]

The significant effect of the GAD and RSM civic education programs also persists after controlling for potential biases in the context of the Heckman self-selection in Model 2.[4] As discussed above, the first stage in the self-selection process is to model explicitly the decision to attend civic education workshops and to produce an estimated residual from this equation for both civic education participants and the control group, which is introduced into the model predicting political participation. The results of the probit model predicting civic education participation indicate that a series of demographic (age, education, gender, rural residence) and political factors (interest, group memberships, prior voting behavior) are associated with exposure to the civic education "treatment." And as can be seen in Model 2 in Table 2A, the coefficient estimate for the Inverse Mills Ratio is .09, which also translates into a .09 estimate for *Rho*, the correlation between the error terms in the civic education treatment and participation equations (as *Rho* equals the coefficient estimate multiplied by 1.03, the standard error of estimate for the participation equation). This estimate is statistically significant, indicating that there is a positive residual correlation between civic education treatment and political participation.

Substantively, however, the residual error correlation between the treatment and outcome equations has relatively little impact on the model's overall results. The effect for GAD is nearly identical to its OLS estimate, and the effect for the RSM treatment falls by about 16% to .26. There are concomitant increases in the estimates of some of the control variables, as the effect of group memberships, political interest, urban residence, and prior voting behavior each register increases over their OLS values.[5] But the overall conclusion from the two models is clear: civic education treatment in two of the four Dominican programs has substantial effects on the individual's propensity to participate in politics at the local level, over and above the fact that treated individuals differ from the control group on a host of observed (and unobserved) factors that predict political participation as well.

[3] GAD's effect on local participation in standard deviation terms is larger than any variable except for group memberships, while RSM's effect rivals gender, political interest, and media exposure in size.

[4] I report the program effects only for GAD and RSM in the Heckman model in Table 2. The insignificant effects for PC and ADOPEM were also insignificant in separate Heckman models.

[5] This occurs because these variables have positive effects in the treatment equation, which, with positive ρ, leads to an underestimation of their effects in the outcome equation (Achen 1986).

Table 2B shows the similar analyses conducted for the South African sample. Model 1 shows that controlling for a series of demographic and political factors, individuals who were treated in the LHR and NIPILAR programs were significantly more participatory than individuals in the control group. These differences—about .4 on the overall participation scale—are approximately 50% the size of the initial observed differences seen in Table 1.[6] As in the Dominican Republic, the civic education effects are among the strongest in the table, with differences between the two treatment groups and the control group being larger than, for example, the relatively sizeable differences in participation between men and women and between black and coloured respondents.

The self-selection Model 2 in the table shows a nearly identical set of results, primarily because the estimated correlation between the error terms in the selection and outcome equations is statistically insignificant. There is, in fact, a slightly *negative* estimate for the effect of the Inverse Mills Ratio (Lambda), which translates into an estimated error term correlation of −.03. This pattern, though statistically insignificant, is congruent with the findings from a previous paper on political tolerance (Finkel 2000), where it was found that individuals in the civic education treatment groups were also predisposed toward lower levels of tolerance than the control group. In the selection equation for South Africa, the findings indicate that key variables such as education and income are in fact *negatively* related to CE treatment, in contrast to the pattern seen in the Dominican Republic. This means that civic education is attracting individuals who possess some characteristics that are negatively related to participation in the South African context, and the negative value for *Rho* in the Heckman model suggests that unmeasured factors in the selection process to a small degree reinforce this tendency. The effect is not large enough to produce differences between the OLS and self-selection models; nevertheless it shows that predispositions to participation are not necessarily higher among the types of individuals who are participants in democracy training sessions. This makes successful civic education more difficult to achieve in an already difficult South African context (Gibson and Gouws 2000, 2001).

How can the variations in program effects within and across countries be explained? It was hypothesized above that the degree to which individuals who were trained in particular groups became active politically would vary directly with the importance placed on participation by the group itself and the resultant behavioral cues imparted by the group leadership and other group members. This cannot be proven definitely with the data at hand, but such an interpretation is highly consistent with the results seen in Tables 2A and 2B. The participants from *Participación Ciudinada* (PC), for example, were given civics training specifically to prepare them for roles as observers in the 1996

[6] CDC participants are also statistically indistinguishable from their own matched control group from KwaZulu Natal, while the effects of the two other South African programs remain, regardless of whether they are compared to all control respondents or to their specific matched groups.

presidential elections, not to mobilize local-level participation more generally. Similarly, ADOPEM's primary emphasis was in the area of women's development in the economic sector; its civic education functions were of secondary importance. By contrast, the *raison d'etre* of the GAD program was to promote local-level problem-solving and community action, while *Radio Santa Maria* in the Dominican Republic and LHR and NIPILAR in South Africa were all broad-based training programs emphasizing knowledge, skills, values, and participation through community workshops conducted by the advocacy groups' "paralegals." The only finding that does not conform to this hypothesis is the low level of mobilization seen among CLC participants in South Africa. This program's emphasis and general structure were similar to RSM, LHR, and NIPILAR, but the results were much less satisfactory in stimulating political participation.

The Indirect Effects of Civic Education

The results thus far suggest that at least some civic education programs can have a substantial stimulating effect on local-level political participation in both the Dominican Republic and South Africa. Yet it remains unclear whether the effects are the result of the behavioral cues and direct mobilization appeals made by the groups conducting the civic education training or whether civic education and other group-related processes influence participation *indirectly*, through their influence on other democratic skills, values, or participatory orientations. Model 3 in Tables 2A and 2B show the results related to this hypothesis in the Dominican Republic and South Africa, respectively. In each country, the same Heckman self-selection model from Model 2 was estimated again, after including five important democratic orientations: political knowledge, civic skills, efficacy, tolerance, and political trust.

The results show very weak support for the "indirect effects" model. In Table 2A, it can be seen that only two of the intervening variables, political knowledge and civic skills, are themselves significant determinants of local-level participation, while efficacy, tolerance, and trust are irrelevant once other variables are taken into account. Controlling for all of these factors in Model 3 decreases the effect of the GAD program on participation by only about 10%, while the effect of the RSM program *increases* somewhat over the "reduced form" estimates from Model 2.[7]

Table 2B shows a very similar set of results from South Africa. Among the potentially intervening variables, knowledge and efficacy have direct effects on participation, while skills, tolerance, and trust are irrelevant. Controlling for all these factors in turn reduces the impact of the two significant civic education programs by only 13% in the case of NIPILAR and 25% in the case of LHR.

[7] The RSM coefficient increases because of an unexpectedly *negative* effect of civic education training on skills among participators in that program.

As in the Dominican Republic, then, there is some indirect effect of civic education on participation through knowledge and efficacy, but most of the direct effects persist after taking these variables into account.

"Conditional Mobilization"

THE ROLE OF CIVIC EDUCATION FREQUENCY AND PEDAGOGICAL METHODS. According to the conditional mobilization model discussed above, the effects of civic education on participation should depend on factors related to the nature of the individual's civic education experience, as well as factors related to the individual's previous store of political resources. That is, we expect to find greater effects when individuals receive more frequent exposure to the mobilizing messages of civic education; when those messages are taught through more intensive, involving participatory methodologies; and when the individual has sufficient political resources to act on the messages received through civic education training.

To measure the frequency of exposure to civic education, respondents were asked how often they had attended sessions sponsored by the particular program in which they were engaged. Response categories ranged from once, twice, three times, to four or more exposures. To measure the extent of exposure to participatory teaching methods, respondents were asked which of the following methods were used in the programs they attended (breaking into small groups, staging plays or dramatizations, playing games, problem solving, and simulations or role-playing). In the Dominican Republic, respondents were asked further whether they had much opportunity to express their own views in the program, and in South Africa, whether workshops had included "staging mock trials of legal proceedings," or "staging mock elections or other kinds of political activities." The scales thus ran from 0 to 6 in the Dominican Republic and 0 to 7 in South Africa. Both variables were then entered into the Heckman self-selection model in place of the simple dummy variable for program participation seen in Tables 2A and 2B, Models 2 and 3.

The results strongly support the conditional mobilization hypotheses in both country contexts. In the Dominican Republic, the results indicate that each training session the individual attended was associated with an increase in local-level participation of .09 (s.e. of .04, $p < .05$), while each participatory method used in CE instruction was associated with an increase in local-level participation of .20 (s.e. of .04, $p < .01$). The corresponding results in South Africa were .14 for CE frequency (s.e. of .05, $p < .01$), and .22 for participatory teaching methodologies (s.e. of .06, $p < .01$). Thus individuals who were trained *more frequently*, and with *more participatory instructional methods*, showed greater increases in local-level participation over the control group than civic education participants who were trained less frequently, with more traditional classroom or lecture-based teaching methodologies.

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL RESOURCES. The second set of hypotheses in the "conditional mobilization" model concerns the effects of civic education on individuals who possess different amounts of participatory resources such as education, political interest, and more extensive group networks. To test these hypotheses, I created simple interaction terms between the civic education treatment and a set of demographic and political factors that correspond to participatory resources in both countries: education, group memberships, political interest, gender (male) and, in South Africa, race (black). In South Africa especially, there was very high multicollinearity between the various civic education and resource products terms. I therefore created dichotomous indicators of group memberships (zero or 1 group versus 2 or more) and political interest (divided at the 50th percentile).[8] The civic education treatment variables, resources, and the interaction terms were then entered into the Heckman self-selection model of Table 2. I show the effects of civic education treatment, prior resources, and the interaction terms in Table 3; the effects of the other demographic and political control variables are omitted to simplify the presentation of results.

Table 3 indicates that the individual's prior political resources condition the effects of CE in both countries in important, though not fully consistent, ways. In the Dominican Republic, all four interaction terms attain statistical significance, despite a reasonable amount of collinearity between the civic education and resources product terms. The model R-squared of .37, moreover, represents a substantial improvement over the .34 value from Table 2. Substantively, the results indicate that CE has larger effects on local participation among men than among women and stronger effects among politically interested and socially attached individuals as well. For example, the effect of GAD civic education training for women is .17, while the effect is over three times that amount (.53) for Dominican men. Thus, civic education serves to mobilize those with fewer social resources (women) to some degree, but greater effects are seen for those whose resources can facilitate the translation of mobilization messages into actual behavior. Similar interaction effects are seen in the Dominican Republic for political interest and group memberships: more highly interested, socially attached individuals are substantially more influenced by civic education mobilization appeals training than less interested, socially isolated trainees.

The same general pattern of interaction effects is seen in South Africa, though the collinearity between the various product terms renders the conclusions somewhat more tentative. It can be seen that significant interactions exist between civic education and political interest and between civic education and the individual's other group memberships. The interaction effects for education, gender, and race are irrelevant. This indicates that highly interested individuals who are trained in civic education sessions in South Africa are substantially more likely to participate in subsequent political activities than less interested

[8] I tested trichotomous versions of education, interest, and group membership variables in the subsequent analysis and found no evidence of improvement in the model fit.

TABLE 3

Interaction Effects of Civic Education Exposure and the Individual's Participatory Resources

	Dominican Republic		South Africa	
	B	s.e.	B	s.e.
Civic Education				
GAD (DominicanRepublic)/LHR (South Africa)	.17	.24	.32	2.79
RSM (Dominican Republic)/NIPILAR (South Africa)	−.31	.21	.40	2.79
Participatory Resources				
Education	−.03	.02	***.16***	.08
Group Memberships	**1.24**	.30	1.02	1.03
Political Interest	**.19**	.04	.18	.19
Gender	**.21**	.07	***.36***	.10
Race		***.31***	.17	
*Civic Education * Resources*				
CE * Education	***−.08****	.04	.02	.05
CE * Group Memberships	**1.72**	.45	***.26***	.15
CE * Political Interest	***.16***	.07	**.39**	.14
CE * Gender	**.36**	.12	−.02	.16
CE * Race	−.10	.23		
R-Squared	.37		.36	
Number of Cases	1532		841	

Coefficients in Bold: $p < .05$
Italicized Bold: $p < .10$
Note: Control variables in Table 1, Model 2 included in the analysis but not shown.

trainees, and that individuals who belong to at least two secondary associations participate more frequently as a result of civic education training. In all of these cases, mobilization efforts within the context of civic education are more successful when individuals have higher levels of prior resources, reflecting greater ability to translate the messages of civic education training into action.

There is one exception, however, to this general pattern, and that is the *negative* interaction in the Dominican Republic between civic education exposure and education. This indicates that, controlling for all other variables, individuals at higher education levels are *less* influenced by civic education appeals than individuals at lower levels of education. The effect, however, should be understood within the context of the overall effect of education on political participation in the Dominican Republic. It can be seen from Table 2A that education has a slight negative impact on local level participation in general, a pattern that conforms with Bratton's (1999) results in Zambia as well. Thus, it is not always the case that educational attainment is positively associated with

political participation in developing democracies. What does appear to be the case, however, is that civic education *reinforces* the resource disparities that exist for political participation otherwise. That is, variables such as political interest, gender (male), and group memberships are positively related overall to political participation in the Dominican Republic, and the interaction of civic education and these resources on participation is therefore positive. Education is negatively related to participation, and the negative interaction of civic education with education reinforces this effect as well. This pattern of a reinforcement effect of civic education on resource-based disparities in participation, again, is fully consistent with a view of civics training as deeply embedded in the "normal" group mobilization dynamics of developing democracies.

Conclusion

This study of the impact of adult civic education on political participation in two developing democracies, the Dominican Republic and South Africa, has shown that democracy training has significant effects on local-level participation in four of the seven programs examined in the two countries. The effects remained significant in multivariate models and in models that attempted to control for the self-selection processes that are inherent in the implementation of civic education programs. The effects were only modestly explained through the impact of civic education training on other democratic orientations such as efficacy, knowledge, tolerance, and trust; almost all of the direct effect of civic education remained after these potentially intervening variables were taken into account. Finally, the effects of civic education on participation in both countries varied considerably, depending on the frequency of the individual's exposure to civic education training, the extent to which the program focused on participation or other democratic orientations, the extent to which the training was conducted with active, participatory teaching methodologies, and the level of the individual's prior participatory resources. In short, civic education *can* mobilize individuals in developing democracies to participate in politics, but not unqualifiedly so. The success of civic education efforts depends directly on the same factors that mitigate or enhance successful group mobilization in general.

The findings have important theoretical implications for our understanding of the development of democratic culture, along with practical implications for the implementation of civic education programs in emerging democracies. First, they lend additional credence to the growing claim that democratic political culture can change significantly in response to short-term stimuli. As suggested by the "lifetime learning model" (Mishler and Rose 1997), democratic orientations and behaviors may be altered under the right conditions. Further, the findings provide an interesting twist to Dalton's assertion in the East German context that "democratic norms are not learned through formal education and indoctrination but through experience with the democratic process" (1994, 490). The analysis here suggests that successful civic education in developing

democracies may be viewed profitably as a combination of "formal indoctrination" and direct political experience; that is civic education exposes individuals to both curricular instruction *and* group-related mobilization processes, and this combination of influences appears to be highly capable of effecting substantial short-term change in individual behavior. Thus, experience *is* critical to the learning of democratic attitudes and behavior, but this does not mean that it is outside the reach of civic education.

The results found here, in combination with those reported in previous work (Finkel 2000; Finkel, Sabatini, and Bevis 2000), lead to two additional conclusions. First, it appears that the effects of civic education on local-level participation are larger in magnitude than those seen for almost all other democratic orientations, including tolerance, trust, knowledge, efficacy, and support for the rule of law. Further, at least in the short-term, these orientations themselves do not necessarily appear to be powerful predictors of individual participation (see also Bratton 1999). An optimistic implication of these findings would be that one promising route for the development of democratic culture may be for advocacy groups and other civic educators to emphasize political mobilization in the hopes that participation itself will stimulate the development of more durable democratic attitudes in the future. A more pessimistic possibility is that in the absence of strong effects of civic education on democratic values and attitudes, such training could be used by groups to mobilize individuals to engage in less desirable, anti-democratic behaviors.

These findings suggest that the effectiveness of adult civic education in developing democracies depends crucially on the advocacy NGOs and other groups that conduct the civic education training. The strategy of funding such groups as a means of strengthening civil society and the democratization process has been severely criticized, as it is often claimed that advocacy groups represent only a narrow part of many countries' emerging civil society, that they are "top-down" or "elite" associations that can only be sustained through external funding, and that they are sometimes prone to corruption and mismanagement (e.g., Carothers 1999; Lasota 1999; Ottaway and Chung 1999). The present study cannot speak to all of these issues, but the results here suggest that such groups can be highly effective mobilizing agents for citizen participation precisely because they are often directly focused on that task. By contrast, the behavioral cues for political participation that emanate from many other civil society groups are likely to be much more muted. Moreover, the fact that advocacy NGOs draw many of the participants for civic education training from existing civil society associations and the fact that civic education appears to have greater effects among individuals who are already members of other secondary groups suggest that advocacy groups are able to use existing civil society groups effectively to further their own aims. To this extent, the strategy of funding explicitly political organizations to mobilize and integrate individuals into emerging democratic systems makes a good deal of sense, provided the organizations themselves are oriented toward democratic goals and practices.

At the same time, the results point to several potential limitations of civic education as a means of developing democratic political culture. First, the results demonstrate that when individuals are trained frequently *and* are trained with active, participatory methodologies, changes in participation can be of substantial magnitude. But in most cases, only a small portion of individuals who receive civic education instruction are exposed to these beneficial pedagogical conditions. For example, only one-third of all civic education recipients in South Africa attended three or more workshops, and less than half were trained with a large number of active participatory teaching methodologies. Given the barriers to the implementation of civic education ranging from financial constraints, logistical difficulties in reaching potential trainees, and political turmoil in certain areas, this limitation raises serious issues for policy makers regarding the feasibility of civic education as part of democratization programs (Carothers 1999).

Finally, the interaction effects seen between civic education and the individual's prior political resources also serve as a reminder that civic education cannot by itself overcome the inequitable distribution of politically relevant resources that characterize many democratic settings. As the results from South Africa make clear, it is not necessarily the case that civic education participants are drawn from the elite and participatory strata in a given country. Advocacy groups often are able to bring marginalized and previously inactive citizens into the civic education activities of the group. But, as is the case in advanced democracies (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999), the *result* of mobilization efforts by civic education groups serves to reinforce many of the resource-based disparities in political participation in developing contexts. Individuals require sufficient political resources and sufficient opportunities to translate the mobilization appeals contained in civic education into concrete political action. Thus, civic education can and does affect the political participation of resource-poor individuals, but the greater effects seen among the resource-rich tends to exacerbate the existing "stratification of participation" in developing democracies.

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